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tool for forecasting Gorshkov' s future actions.
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as the prime causes of world unrest. 2. Gorshkov is confident
of the expansion of communism and Soviet sea power. 3- He
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I. INTRODUCTION
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, has likened him to
a "20th century Russian Mahan, an articulate advocate of
seapower as a vital—indeed indispensable—attribute of
great power status (11^:70)." The British magazine The
Economist has observed that "the number of great admirals is
small," but they have included him in that number by com-
paring him to a "modern day John Fisher (1150) •" Norman
Polmar, a noted maritime analyst, speaks of him with the
likes of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz (116:199) • Vice Admiral
J. F. Calvert, USN, refers to his durability and consummate
political skills: "Through Stalin, Krushchev, and Brezhnev,
the nimble admiral has remained at the helm (II?: 57)."
Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George W. Anderson,
Jr., USN, has written "Under his leadership, the Soviet Navy
has been elevated to an equal component of the Armed Forces
and most probably will soon be considered the premier ser-
vice among the branches of the Soviet Armed Forces (118:63)."
And so the benediction and veneration by Western naval
commentators continues . But who is this man of whom they
speak? Who is Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov? What manner of
man has been able to transform the Soviet Navy from a meek,
coastal defense force into its present position as prime
challenger for world ocean supremacy? What are Admiral
Gorshkov' s goals for his navy, and what are his perceptions

of the political arena? How far will the Admiral go in
pursuing his objectives, and what are his plans for the
future?
In examining these questions— if the investigation is
to be more than a literary, intuitive exercise— a clear,
systematic construct must be developed which facilitates
prediction and explanation (1190). The operational code
system is such a construct. This system, utilizing content
analysis, allows the researcher to fulfill investigative
requirements on two levels: substance and methodology.
Substance is important because Gorshkov must be analyzed
through his words and communications. The results of this
analysis will be correlated with past and extrapolated to
future substantive matters. Methodology is vital so that
a broad, diverse data base may be systematically and ob-
jectively scrutinized in a manner which can be replicated
in future studies involving other important political/military
elites.
This thesis is divided into nine sections. Part I.
is the introduction. Part II. defines the nature of the
problem by: 1) delineating the controlling purpose, and
2) explaining the importance of the inquiry. Part III. is
an exposition of the methodological tools of the research:
the operational code construct and content analysis. Part IV.
investigates the data from which the code was constructed,
and from which the most significant themes were extracted:
the data represents some 113 separate documents in total.
8

Part V. is an exhibit of the primary results of the re-
search: Admiral Gorshkov's operational code. This section
also displays a summary of the code, lists important limita-
tions of the operational code construct, and outlines areas
for futher methodological research. Part VI. presents a
"macro" examination of the 50 most significant themes of
the Gorshkov material. This section provides a general
statistical analysis, whereas Part VIII. illustrates similar
information on a discrete theme basis. Part VII. predicts
future Soviet action based upon: 1) the results of Admiral
Gorshkov's operational code, and 2) a systematic, thematic
analysis of the Admiral's 5° most consistent public topics.
This section is perhaps the most interesting part of the
thesis, albeit controversial. Part VIII. contains appendices.
Appendix A lists the 50 most significant themes derived
from the Gorshkov data. Important background information,
statistical analyses, and representative quotations are
included for- each of the main theme categories. Appendix B
is an exposition of the coder reliability test that was
utilized in this research. Part IX. lists footnote and
selected bibliographic information.

II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. CONTROLLING PURPOSE
The central thrust of this thesis explores the utility
and relevance of employing the operational code construct
on a contemporary Soviet military figure who is involved
in the Soviet decision-making process. The results of such
a code should clearly identify the subject's perception of
political life, as well as determining the limiting bounds
of the most probable means which the subject would select
in pursuing his political goals
.
If one is to truly understand an elite figure such as
Admiral Gorshkov, then one must analyze his decision process
through an investigation of his philosophic and instrumental
beliefs systems . The operational code construct provides
a very systematic method for performing such a task.
B. IMPORTANCE OF INQUIRY
Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie , USN, perceptively commented
that the "Navies in War and Peace" series "caught" his
attention because "in this series of articles by Admiral
Gorshkov, we have a rare glimpse into the mind of a very
important man. It is not a complete psycho-intellectual
analysis, not a blueprint, but a glimpse into a mind.... The
most important element of intelligence in any adversary
situation. .. .is some degree of insight into the mind of the
opponent (120:68)." This quotation crystalizes the vital
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importance of knowledge of one's opponent; knowledge not
only of his capabilities, but also knowledge of his goals
and intentions
.
Captain Robert B. Bathurst, USN, in an article prepared
for the Naval War College Review , also spoke of the im-
portance of divining the intention of the opponent. He
criticized the analytical direction of such time-worn
methodologies as technological forecasting and its contempo-
rary running-mates net-assessment and functional analysis
(122:16-27). The Captain did not deride these systems of
analysis per se, but rather indicated that analysts have
tended to emphasize hardware to the exclusion of intentions
He contends that such an approach often misses the real
issues. It only addresses one half of the question.
Captain Bathrust's criticism is well founded, but such
criticism does not ease the dilemma of the analyst. As one
moves away from technological forecasting toward political
predictions, forecasting accuracy is reduced. The analyst
is faced with the dilemma of predicting important questions
of intent with low accuracy, or projecting less important
hardware evolutions with a high degree of confidence. The
prediction of goals and intentions is always more chal-
lenging and interesting than forecasting hardware capa-
bilities, but the tools of political prediction are not
nearly so refined as their technological counterparts.
The primary goal of good intelligence is providing
consumers with the best, most precise evaluation possible
11

of the future status, capabilities, and political inten-
tions of foreign powers (121:157) • The importance of
understanding the intentions of Soviet policymakers is
self-evident, but the selection of the most effective means
of obtaining that understanding is not so obvious.
Historically, the US intelligence community has studied
Soviet policymakers via the intelligence profile. These
profiles are a synthesized summary of biographic data,
attache comments, and defector reports. Intelligence pro-
files can be a very effective tool, and often solve parts
of the dilemma posed by Captain Bathurst, but profiles are
handicapped in three critical areas. First, intelligence
profiles are written appraisals of documented facts. As
such, profiles often present Soviet leaders in two dimen-
sions, facts and numbers, but do little to grasp that third
dimension which is so important in Soviet decisions: the
subject's perception of political life. Second, analytical
preconceptions often project American attitudes onto the
Soviet psyche as if the Soviets lacked originality. The
old approach of "We make decisions in this manner, so if
the Soviets are 'rational 1 then they must too..." is all
too often present. Third, intelligence profiles discount
propaganda. But as Captain Bathurst observes "even
propaganda tells us a considerable amount about how men
think (122:17) ."
The operational code system fills in the gaps and
avoids many of the pitfalls of intelligence profiles.
The code provides insight into the subject's perception
12

of political life. The code construct, if applied ob-
jectively, rejects analytical preconceptions. Finally,
the operational code sets forth an excellent typology for
the content analysis of public propaganda statements.
Nathan Leites first employed the operational code in
examining the psyche of Soviet decision-makers in his
landmark effort, The Operational Code of the Politburo .
In this effort, Leites rigorously defined the motives
and nuances of the inputs to the Politburo's decision pro-
cess. The content of the Leites* code was drawn exclusively
from the writings of Lenin and Stalin—including propaganda.
In 1967, Alexander George formulated a structure for the
Leites code. The operational code methodology has been
widely applied to American political figures (e.g. Secre-
taries of State Dulles and Rusk, Senators Fullbright and
Church, etc.), but the code has not been applied to a
contemporary military figure.
Admiral Gorshkov presents a particularly appealing
example for such an investigation for several reasons.
First, the Admiral occupies a prominent position bridging
the two policymaking centers of the Soviet Union. On the
one hand, he is a Deputy in the Ministry of Defense of
the Council of Ministers; on the other, he is a full voting
member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. Second, he is closely allied with
prestigious members of the Politburo. Third, as regards
the Navy, if any single individual can be tapped as
13

the prime mover of Soviet naval expansion, it is Sergei
Gorshkov. It has been Gorshkov, 65, who has guided the
growth of the Navy as its Commander-in-Chief for the past
19 years. He has totally reshaped the Soviet Union's
naval strategy, and has transformed the fleet into the
most flexible arm of Soviet foreign policy. Finally, due
to his demonstrated ability, unprecedented military tenure,
and high Party connections, Admiral Gorshkov has assumed
the position as preeminent spokesman and prophet for
Soviet sea power. The operational code of a military
strategist so close to the center of Soviet policy de-
cisions should be a useful tool indeed.
The importance of developing an operational code for
Admiral Gorshkov may be summarized as follows: 1) the
operational code construct provides insight into problems
heretofore unavailable through other methods of analysis;
2) the operational code provides a means of fathomming
the perceptions of Gorshkov the man, the role that he has
set for the Soviet Navy, and the bounds of the means which
he would employ in pursuing those goals; 3) the operational
code can serve as a useful tool in forecasting future
Gorshkov decisions; and k) to the extent that the applica-
tion of the operational code methodology is successful in
the Gorshkov case, then the same methods might find broader




The explanation of the methodological approach of
this thesis is divided into tv/o parts: 1) an analysis
of the operational code system as formulated by Nathan
Leites, categorized by Alexander George, and applied to
Sergei Gorshkov, and 2) the rationale for the use of con-
tent analysis and its application in this research project.
A. THE OPERATIONAL CODE
1. Nathan Leites' Contribution
The operational code concept was formulated first
by Nathan Leites in 1951 in his scholarly book, The
Operational Code of the Politburo . Leites continued his
work in the behavioral approach to the study of political
elites in 1953 with A Study in Bolshevism . Both books ad-
vanced the operational code as "a set of general beliefs
about fundamental historical issues and central questions
as these bear, in turn, on the problem of action (123:191)."
Leites stated that "The intention is not to discuss the
major theories of Leninism-Stalinism but to discover the
rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective
political conduct (12^:xi) . " Both of Leites' books were
advances over the biographic profiles of his day v/hich
did not illuminate political orientations, the style of
decision calculations, or the behavioral premises of the
subjects in question. These same shortcomings are present
in most intelligence profiles today.
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The operational code provided a breakthrough in
methodology; the code was a new and original analytic tool.
The content of The Operational Code of the Politburo elicited
a far-reaching analysis of the Politburo. Prior to 1951 *
much had been written about Soviet military might and
Communist philosophy, but little had been written about
the guiding force of the Soviet Union: the Politburo.
The Leites books synthesized general Politburo beliefs
about fundamental political issues as they bore upon foreign
policy calculations. The content of the Politburo code
was derived from a thematic analysis of the quotations of
Lenin, Stalin, and documented accounts of Politburo action.
Leites formulated a set of themes or rules (code) which
the Politburo/Bolsheviks believed to be essential to politi-
cal action.
The comparision between the tasks which faced
Nathan Leites and the tasks which face this thesis follow:
1) Leites studied the guiding force of Soviet society, and
this thesis investigates the guiding force of the Soviet
Navy; 2) much has been written and predicted concerning
the capabilities of the Soviet Navy, but much less has been
written about the intended use of Soviet sea power or its
motivating forces; 3) Leites endeavored to determine those
factors which shaped the "prism" through which the Polit-
buro's perception of reality was focused, and this thesis
examines these same factors as they apply to Admiral Gorshkov;
16

b) the content of the Leites code was written communication-
the content of the Gorshkov code is extracted from the
Admiral's communications and public addresses from 1955-
197^; 5) "the Gorshkov code, like that of the Politburo, is
a study of the rules which its subject believes to be
essential to political action.
An attractive feature of the operational code
methodology is that it bridges the gap of time and leader-
ship. Leites concluded, for a variety of reasons, that an
elites' fundamental political beliefs are resistant to
change. Therefore, once Admiral Gorshkov* s code has been
developed carefully, the code will be modified only after
a great deal of time, or by a particularly traumatic
experience
.
The shortcomings of the Leites system are as
follows: 1) Leites did not structure his code in a clear
manner and, as a result, relationships between certain
variables in his code are obscure; and 2) the order and
heirachy of the Leites code is not stated clearly. Alexan-
der George corrected these shortcomings.
2. Alexander George's Classification Scheme
In I967, Alexander George, of Stanford University,
devised a classification scheme based upon the two Leites
books. George set forth his construct in an International
Studies Quarterly article entitled "The 'Operational Code':
A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and
Decision-Making." George sought to synthesize and amplify
17

the relationships between issues and postulates fundamental
to the Leites code. George delineated a system of "phil-
osophic and instrumental beliefs" which were critical to
the decision process of political activity.
Alexander George recognized that the operational
code was not the total answer to the study of the decision
process, but rather that the code represented a significant
portion of the inputs to that process. "A political leader's
beliefs about the nature of politics and political con-
flict, his view regarding the extent to which historical
developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct
strategy and tactics—whether these beliefs be referred to
as 'an operational code,* 'Weltanschauung,' 'cognitive map,'
'or an elite's political culture' --are among the factors
influencing the actor's decisions. The operational code
is a particularly significant portion of the actor's entire
set of beliefs about political life (123:197)." George
did go on to add that a comprehensive model of decision-
making would also consider the actor's ethical and normative
beliefs. But when you deal with Communist figures, their
ethical and normative beliefs are so tied to their phil-
osophic belief system, as to be indistinguishable from it.
George, like Leites, developed an actor's opera-
tional code through the use of content analysis of the
actor's responses to a set of questions relating to his
philosophic and instrumental belief systems. The code
is a reading of the acceptable limits of an actor's
18

responses to a given event in the present or future de-
rived from his consistent responses to similar past events.
According to George, an elite's "answers" to such philo-
sophical and instrumental (ends-means) questions "can help
the researcher and policy planner to 'bound 1 the alternative
ways in which the subject may perceive different types of
situations and approach the task of making a rational
assessment of alternative courses of action (123:200)."
In short, the explanation and prediction of leadership
behavior are improved by understanding the leader's politi-
cal beliefs. The researcher or policy planner will still
be unable to predict with confidence the precise behavior
of the subject in any specific circumstance, but he will
have an excellent idea of the range of choices which are
acceptable to the subject in a decision situation. Further,
if one were to "smooth" predictions about a given subject
over an extended period of time, then the researcher could
predict "average" or mean behavior with a high degree of
certainty.
Admiral Gorshkov's code is formulated using the
George construct as its organization model. The Gorshkov
code is composed of two parts: 1) his philosophic belief
system which consists of the assumptions and premises he
has made regarding the nature of politics, the role of the
individual in history, the image of the opponent, etc. --in
short, a summary of how firmly he has embraced the tenets
of the Marxist- Leninist ideology, and 2) his instrumental
19

belief system which consists of the "answers" that he has
developed to ends' means relationships— e.g. how are goals
pursued? What is the best approach for selecting goals
or objectives for political action? Etc. --in short, what
are the optimum means to be utilized in pursuing political
objectives?
a. The Philosophic Content of Gorshkov's Operational
Code
1) What is Gorshkov's view of political life?
Does he view the political universe as one of harmony or
conflict? How does he perceive the fundamental character
of the United States? Its navy?
a) Does he embrace Marx's concept of
dialectical materialism?
b) Does he believe as Lenin that imperialism
is the highest form of capitalism and the most serious threat
to Communism?
c) Does he view US leadership as corrupt
and hostile from top to the bottom? What about its military
leadership?
d) Are the capitalists determined to an-
nihilate Communism? Can there be any "middle ground" be-
tween total Communist victory or total defeat?
e) Have Gorshkov's views been modified over
time? Have his views changed with changes in Party leadership?
2) What are the prospects for the eventual
realization of one's fundamental political values and
20

aspirations? Can Gorshkov be optimistic or pessimistic
on this score?
a) Will Communism eventually triumph?
Worldwide?
b)
. Is castastrophe an ever-presnet danger?
What is the role of the Party in avoiding the realization
of castastrophe?
3) Is the political future predictable? In
what sense and to what extent?
a) Does Gorshkov accept the determinist
approach of Marxism?
b) Is there a timetable for political action?
c) What is the role of the Communist Party
of Soviet Union (CPSU) in the interpretation of history?
Can intelligent, well-calculated action on the part of
the Party "hurry" history along?
k) How much control or mastery can one have
over historical development?
a) Does Gorshkov believe that dedicated
political actors can move history?
b) What is the role of the Party in regards
to the "production" and education of such actors?
c) As a member of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, how does Gorshkov view his own responsibilities
with respect to the advancement of the Communist cause?
5) What is the role of chance in human affairs
and in historical development?
a) Does Gorshkov believe that all politically
21

important events are explainable by the laws of Marxism-
Leninism?. Is his belief a formality or a reality?
b) If Gorshkov minimizes the role of
chance in human affairs, does he believe that there should
be a continuing plan for the development of Communism
in general and Soviet naval science in particular?
c) What is the danger of muddling through?
The "answers" that Gorshkov gives to the questions
listed above will reflect his philosophic belief system
concerning politics in general and naval matters in
particular. This set of beliefs, in turn, operates as
the foundation for his instrumental beliefs which refer
more specifically to the key aspects of knowledge and
action: e.g. ends-means relationships.
b. The Instrumental Beliefs of Gorshkov'
s
Operational Code
1) What is the best approach for selecting
goals or objectives for political action?
a) Does Gorshkov believe in the minimax
strategy?
b) Does Gorshkov believe in pursuing an
optimizing strategy, or rather a protracted, graduated
system of objectives? Has he applied either of these
strategies in developing the Soviet Navy? Should uncal-
culated adventures be avoided?
c) Does Gorshkov believe in the Soviet
policy of democratic centralism? How does Gorshkov view
the primacy of the Politburo in naval matters?
22

d) How does Gorshkov view programs which
could achieve short range gains to the delay of long range
victory?
2) How are the goals of action pursued most
effectively?
a) Should naval goals be pushed to the
limit? What meaning does this have in naval warfare and
in the international mission of the Soviet navy? Should
the enemy he annihilated or allowed to exist?
b) Are enemy concessions a sign of weakness?
c) How far should Gorshkov push naval
expansion within the Soviet Armed Forces? What are the
political limits to naval prestige within the Soviet
military heirarchy?
d) Is retreat ever a viable option in
military conflict? In political conflict?
3) How are the risks of political action cal-
culated, controlled, and accepted?
a) Does Gorshkov favor any behavior which
could ultimately provoke the annihilation of the Communist
Party? What about political action which could jeopardize
the position of the Soviet Navy?
b) Does Gorshkov believe that major goals
can be pursued with limited means? If not, what are his
beliefs in this matter? What does he think about the
escalation of local wars into nuclear conflict?




a) Does Gorshkov favor procrastination
or precipitous action? Or neither?
b) Does Gorshkov favor riding the crest
of the moment, or continually advancing his causes at
every opportunity?
c) How does Gorshkov view individual
initiative?
d) If nuclear war begins, should the Soviets
initial reaction be limited? Is the first stage of war
important?
5) What is the utility and role of different
means for advancing one's interest?
a) What is Gorshkov' s interpretation of
the cooperation among the Soviet Armed Forces?
b) Should the Navy take advantage of
foreign tactics in the development of their naval science?
c) What is the role of agreement and/or
compromise in Gorshkov' s decision scheme? Can collaboration
be an effective tool?
d) What is the Party's view of utilizing
diverse methods in obtaining their goals? Does Gorshkov
agree?
3. Modification to Admiral Gorshkov' s Operational Code
Most political elites, Admiral Gorshkov not with-
standing, have a tendency to deal with problems on a
"lessons learned" basis. These lessons are viewed as de-
cision models or precedents. An example might be Admiral
24

Gorshkov's early and continued exposure to the "small war"
theory of Soviet naval science. He will draw from this
model when faced with a "new" decision. Therefore, a
decision process or scheme is developed, at least in part,
from dealing with elements of past decisions even though
the new circumstances may he entirely different.
Once a political elite has developed a decision approach
(operational code) , one must "be very cautious when observing
what may appear to be arbitrary changes to that approach.
An actor's operational code becomes deeply engrained, and
can only be altered after years of lengthy "salami slicing ,"
or else a particularly traumatic experience.
Particular emphasis and attention should be directed
toward apparent changes in an actor's philosophic belief
system. If Admiral Gorshkov were to change his perception
of the US over time, then one could predict a basic change
in the operational code of the Admiral. The image of one's
opponent is the central structure of the entire operational
code system. If an actor modifies his perception of the
enemy, then his whole decision process is effected.
"Salami slicing"--In this technique, an actor takes small,
incremental steps toward a political objective. He does so
in order to avoid confrontation with an opponent who has the
power to block the attainment of the desired goal. No
single step, taken individually, will cause the opponent to
react, but, when the steps are integrated, the goal is
achieved nonetheless. The important point of this approach
is knowledge of the opponent's threshhold of reaction. The
opponent in this context is Admiral Gorshkov's own sub-
conscious tendency to resist change. This term is used with
different contextual meaning later in this thesis.
25

A basic hypothesis of this thesis is that Admiral
Gorshkov has been consistent in his political views
and perceptions during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief
of the Soviet Navy. In order to prove or disprove this
hypothesis, data is analyzed from two periods: prior to
I965 and post 19&5 • These two periods represent the rules
of Krushchev and Brezhnev, respectively. The themes that
make up Gorshkov' s code will be scrutinized for consistency,
or the lack thereof, over these two periods. The results
of this analysis should portray whether Admiral Gorshkov'
s
operational code has been modified by either leadership
or time. Again, the initial hypothesis contends that no
substantive changes have taken place.
B. CONTENT ANALYSIS
1. Why Content Analysis ?
"Content analysis is a multipurpose research method
developed specifically for investigating problems in which
the content of communications serves as the basis for in-
ference (125:2). " Since personal interviews with Admiral
Gorshkov are impractical, this thesis examines the subject
on the basis of his communications. The primary source,
then, for producing data to construct Admiral Gorshkov*
s
operational code is the content analysis of his writings,
interviews (public), and speeches: some 113 separate
source documents in all. Procedures for the use of con-
tent analysis employed in this thesis are outlined by
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Ole R. Holsti in Content Analysis for the Social Sciences
and Humanities .
2. Objectivity, System, and Generality
Objectivity stipulates that each step in the re-
search process must be carried out on the basis of
explicitly formulated rules and procedures. A careful
research design for this thesis was constructed and fol-
lowed in order to minimize the researcher" s subjective
predispositions . The importance of academic replication
was noted and tested. Each document was coded and analyzed
in a systematic fashion. The results of the analysis were
compared to the documented goals of Soviet leadership and
naval science; thereby meeting the requirement for generality
as it relates to theoretical relevance.
3. Categories, Units and Enumeration
Fifty main theme categories were formulated in this
research effort by means of thematic analysis. The re-
searcher initiated the analysis of Admiral Gorshkov with
no preconceived ideas other than that the categories of
analysis should reflect the basic purposes of the research.
In essence, the data spoke for itself. Each document was
analyzed in a general way in order to determine the basic
themes which Gorshkov was espousing. Major theme cate-
gories soon emerged from this initial analysis. And just
as quickly, the Admiral began to repeat these themes time
and time again. These theme categories were derived from
an analysis of public statements on public issues. The
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analysis of the data was limited to its manifest content,
and no effort was extended to uncover "deeper" meanings.
The general requirements for theme categories in
content analysis are as follows: 1) that the categories
reflect the purposes of the research, 2) be exhaustive,
3) be mutually exclusive, ^) independent, and 5) be derived
from a single classification system (125:95)* The fifty
categories of this research certainly reflect the purposes
of the research, because sufficient information was readily
available in these categories to "answer" the questions
necessary to formulate the Gorshkov code . The categories
were not independent or mutually exclusive because of the
complex interdependence of so many of the variables
associated with Admiral Gorshkov* s belief system. However,'
the research was not impaired significantly because of
these limitations.
The recording unit for all analysis in this thesis
is the theme. Thematic analysis was utilized exclusively
in formulating data to be used in Gorshkov °s operational
code. Once a theme was detected in a subject document,
it was coded and listed in one of the fifty categories
listed in Appendix A.
Theme frequency was the common unit of enumeration
employed in this thesis. Frequency of appearance is defined
as dichotomous: the theme was either present or not.
Multiple occurrences of a theme in the same document were
registered as a single occurrence. Statistical analyses
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were completed for each category to determine the per-
centage of occurrence of each theme throughout the entire
sample, and to determine a ranking or priority of themes
as elicited by Admiral Gorshkov. Each document of the
sample received equal weight in calculating its contribution
or effect on the total sample.
k. Sampling, Reliability, and Validity
Sample size for the Gorshkov study was 113 docu-
ments. This represents by far the largest sample of
Gorshkov documents systematically analyzed to date. The
sample was limited to public statements because of the
non-availability of unclassified private statements. How-
the purpose of this research is the analysis of public
beliefs, and private statements would add little to the
intent of this investigation. A major restriction on
sampling is the limitation of available translated docu-
ments. However, even this limitation is ameliorated by
the fact that all major "Navy Day" speeches by Admiral
Gorshkov have been translated, and these represent the bulk
of his major policy statements. In addition, Admiral
Gorshkov 1 s epic series, "Navies in War and Peace" is nearly
a sufficient sample by itself. In short, the sampling
procedures of this thesis are more pervasive than any
other similar study yet undertaken.
Reliability ensures that repeated measures with
the same instrument on a given sample of data should yield
similar results (125:135) • Reliability in this thesis
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was measured in the following manner: 1) ten coders
were chosen to code two randomly selected passages each;
2) five coders were selected from the Naval Intelligence
Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, two coders
were selected from other activities at the School, and
three coders were selected with no connection with the
Graduate School whatsoever; 3) a short "briefing on coding
requirements was given to each coder; 4) the coders were
asked to perform the following operations—a) determine
the main themes in sample #1, and determine if a set of
given themes was present in sample #2; 5) then mean averages
were calculated to determine intercoder reliability as
well as category reliability. Intercoder Reliability
was 92^ . Category Reliability was S9fo . These tests are
listed in Appendix B. A cross check of the findings of
this thesis as compared to the conclusions obtained in a
similar study by the Center for Naval Analysis also provides
another reliability check (126; 127; 128 and 129).
The primary test of validity is whether ,Lthe
results seem plausible." Predictive validity will be
tested by the realization of results of Section VII. of
the thesis . The rigor of the methodological procedures
also lend a measure of validity to this research project.
But the validity of Admiral Gorshkov's operational code
and main themes must be determined ultimately by the reader.
Does his code conform to the expansion of Soviet sea power?
Have hardware decisions been made which bear out his views
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on the submarine and the international mission of the
Soviet Navy? Do his speeches have the ring of a Party
ideolog. Construct validity can be assured by the careful
execution of the operational code methodology, but ulti-
mate validity can only be proven by the "plausibility"




One hundred and thirteen documents compose the source
material from which data was extracted in order to form
Admiral Gorshkov's operational code. The documents are
English translations of Russian public statements made
by Admiral Gorshkov. The inclusive dates of these state-
ments run from July 24, 1955 to July 28, 1974: some 19
years of public comment. No information was available
for 1957 or 1961. An average of six documents per year
were available for coding. A high of seventeen documents
were coded for 1972: the year of the "Navies in War and
Peace" series. (See Figure 1 for a further breakdown
of documents per year.)
Translations of the Gorshkov statements were provided
by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) , the Joint
Publications Research Service (JPRS) , and Naval Intelligence
Command (NIC). All translations were unclassified. Typical
translations were extracted from the Soviet Home News
Service , PRAVDA , TASS , Krasnaya Zvezda ( Red Star ) , Soviet
Fleet , Trud, Morskoy Sbornik ( Naval Digest ) , Za Rube z horn ,
Izvestiya , Literary Gazette , Soviet Russia , Agitator , etc...
Admiral Gorshkov makes major naval policy statements
each year on Navy Day: normally the third v/eek of July.
Although the Navy Day statements are Gorshkov's principle
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such as Armed Forces Day, the Anniversary of the October
Revolution, and the Anniversary of the Victory of the
Great Patriotic War (WW II) . Admiral Gorshkov has been
interviewed on occasion, and he periodically publishes
articles on naval science, but a vast majority of his
translated public statements coincide with his addresses
at major Soviet celebrations.
During 1972 and early 1973 i Admiral Gorshkov published
his epic, eleven-part series entitled "Navies in War and
Peace." In this series, Admiral Gorshkov presented a
summation of his concepts of naval science within the con-
text of a historical survey of the expansion of Soviet sea
power. This series was first printed in the Soviet Naval
Digest , and ran some 50 » 000 words in length: comparable
to a 150 page book. There is no Soviet publication at the
unclassified level that approaches the "Navies in War and
Peace" series in terms of its educational content or broad
comment on matters of Soviet naval strategy.
Admiral Gorshkov used the "Navies in War and Peace"
series to develop a unified view among his officers con-
cerning the changing role of the Soviet Navy and its
peacetime employment as an effective instrument of Soviet
foreign policy. Further, through the wide use of historical
example, the Admiral hoped to solidify the heroic traditions
of the Soviet Navy once and for all. Gorshkov has often
cited the value of propaganda in training cadres, and "Navies
in War and Peace" certainly has the flavor of Soviet propaganda
3^

In terms of scope and length, the "Navies in War and
Peace" series is sufficient for systematic analysis. Al-
though the series represents only 10$ of the total number
of documents which this thesis analyzed, it nevertheless
is an interesting benchmark with which to compare what
Gorshkov said before and after its publication.
No classified or private statements were used in
formulating data for the Gorshkov code. There are three
reasons for this restriction. First, a basic premise of
this thesis is the analysis of public opinions on public
issues. Policy statements, public speeches and interviews,
and published articles are the foremost indicators of
Gorshkov* s beliefs concerning public issues. His private
comments might be interesting, but they are not available
in sufficient quantity to withstand the rigors of systematic
analysis. Second, although classified material relating
to Admiral Gorshkov is available, classification per se
makes academic replication difficult. One of the principle
merits of this study is the collection of a large sample
of unclassified Gorshkov statements under one cover. Sub-
stitution of classified material for unclassified documents
would seriously reduce the dissemination of the product
of this research effort, and be counterproductive to its
basic purposes. Third, as will be discussed in Section VI.
,
Admiral Gorshkov is amazingly consistent. He formulated
all his primary naval themes by the early 1960*s and has
done little to depart from their basic content. In short,
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thematic analysis renders a clear picture of Sergei
Gorshkov without the necessity of resorting to either
private or classified material.
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V. THE GORSHKOV OPERATIONAL CODE
A. THE PHILOSOPHIC CONTENT OF GORSHKOV S OPERATIONAL CODE
1. What is Gorshkov's view of political life? Does
he view the political universe as one of harmony or con-
flict? How does he perceive the fundamental character of
the United States? Its Navy? Have Admiral Gorshkov's
views changed?
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov views the political universe
to exist in a state of intense and perpetual conflict.
"After the division of the world into two systems as a
result of the October Revolution in Russia, the policy
of the imperialist powers was determined to a considerable
degree by their constant desire to destroy the Soviet Union
(95:53) •" He views the chief protagonists in this struggle
to be the United States and the Soviet Union. "The basic
source of war remains the aggressive course of American
imperialism, reflected in the US capitalist monopolies'
striving for world domination (9*009)." "American policy
and strategy, (is) aimed at one goal—the achievement of




Admiral Gorshkov agrees with Lenin that "imperialism
is the highest form of capitalism," and further that im-
perialism has reached its highest state of development in
the United States (91*55) • A quotation from his Navy Day
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speech of 1967 clearly captures his view of capitalism and
also the -US: "Our country steadfastly pursues a peaceful
policy. But v/e cannot for a minute forget the instructions
of V.I. Lenin, that as long as capitalism exists and the
economic foundations for the beginning of aggressive war
remains, the danger exists of the unleashing of military
adventures by reactionary circles of imperialism (^3*19) •"
Even as Admiral Gorshkov perceives the US as the
basis for conflict in the world, he views its Navy as its
most flexible military weapon. To Gorshkov, the US personi-
fies the essence of imperialism projected through sea power.
He describes the US Navy as a policy instrument as well as
a strategic force. "The (US) Navy possesses the capability
to vividly demonstrate the economic and military might of
the US beyond its borders during peacetime (98:59)." "The
(US) Navy represents not only a part of the armed forces,
which was employed in war in naval theaters, but also a
weapon of state policy in peacetime, which permits (the US)
to enslave underdeveloped people and countries overseas,
and to transform them into colonies (89:25)." The US
Navy has "the capability to suddenly appear close to the
shores of different countries and immediately proceed to
carry out their assigned missions. . .as an important weapon
of diplomacy and policy in peacetime, which in many cases
has permitted the achievement of political goals without




"Demonstration of naval force by the leading capital-
ist sea powers have been employed more than once to put
pressure on the Soviet Union and the countries of the
Socialist community. The US Navy has especially distin-
guished itself by special activity in these operations. In
the postwar years, it was handed the role of a connecting
link in a chain of bridgeheads and military bases created
by the American imperialists around the perimeter of the
border of our country. The American Navy with its attack
groups of nuclear forces was supposed to fill in the gaps in
this 'ring of fire* ... (98:62) . " "In the opinion of US
military leaders, the US Navy in modern times constitutes a
most important means of nuclear rocket attacks against the




"The US militarist circles give priority to the development
of submarine missile systems .. .because they are less vul-
nerable (80:M2) "...but "the US Sixth Fleet also can strike
the central portions of the USSR from their bases in the
Mediterranean with nuclear armed carrier aircraft' (103 :1) .
"
Gorshkov states that "50% of the total strategic nuclear-
rocket power of the armed forces of the US is concentrated
in the US Navy (27:CC3)." He argues that that percentage
will increase
.
The theme of hostility runs throughout Admiral
Gorshkov's statements as regards the United States and its
Navy. He cites the i960 incursion of Soviet airspace by
a US U-2 (12:CC3)i the "Caribbean Crisis" of 1962 (1?:1),
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the rearmament of W. Germany and the foundation of NATO
(10:CC9)i the continued violations of international law
at sea (46:1), US Naval provocations in the Black and
Baltic Seas (81:3) i and US plans for massive exploitation
of the world's oceans ( 99 s 5^) . The Admiral characterizes
the US Navy as a "policeman's stick (30:CC3)." He spe-
cifically derides US intervention in Vietnam, Cuba, Turkey,
the Dominican Republic, Greece, Lebanon, Cambodia, Laos,
Isreal, Germany, and "other Latin American and African
countries." He renounces the "ring of fire" created by
the US through NATO "in order to encircle the socialist
community (98:62) .
"
Admiral Gorshkov firmly embraces the conflict theory
of dialectical materialism (89:20). He is confident of
the "ultimate victory of Communism in its dialectic clash
with capitalism (62:E8)." The Admiral contends that no
quarter can be given, no middle ground realized, in the con-
flict with capitalism. "The enemy (whether in war or peace)
must be utterly annihilated (24:10)." "Although the
military-technical revolution (and its political counterpart)
is constantly introducing new things in all military affairs
...the final goals of naval warfare (and political con-
frontation) remain the same: defeat of the enemy and the
destruction of his vital forces and material (89:20)."
Admiral Gorshkov notes on several occasions that
after World War II, capitialist countries with traditional
naval power rose to prominence. He states that the United
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States headed this group. The Admiral has great respect
for the power of the US Navy, and as early as 1958 spoke
of preparing "for operations against a strong, technically
well-equipped enemy (5*1)." The Admiral's respect and
even envy have not subsided in the intervening years.
Admiral Gorshkov's view of political life and his
perception of the enemy have not changed over time. (See
C. "Modifications to Admiral Gorshkov's Operational Code.")
A hostile view of the enemy was projected in 70% of Admiral
Gorshkov's public statements during the Krushchev era and
in 6kfo of his statements under Brezhnev.
However, Admiral Gorshkov has increased his refer-
ences to ideological concepts in recent years. (e.g. See
theme #32, Section VI.) If anything, the Admiral has become
more conservative, militant, and hard-line during the
Brezhnev rule. Political ideology per se was only mentioned
in iSfo of Gorshkov's sampled public statements under
Krushchev; whereas under Brezhnev that same figure has near-
ly doubled to 32^. Political ideology must now be con-
sidered a vital theme in Gorshkov's operational code.
The only verbal evidence of Admiral Gorshkov's
mellowing in recent years is a single quotation in May 197^
in which he indicates: "the imperialists .. .have begun to
orient themselves toward the principles of peaceful co-
existence. .. (109: V5) • " However, the Admiral quickly




Admiral Gorshkov is faced with the dilemma of
dealing with an enemy which he fundamentally distrusts.
The Kremlin leadership would pursue a policy of reapproach-
ment with the West, but the Admiral has difficulty with
this tactic. On the one hand, Admiral Gorshkov is re-
quired to praise the "tireless activity of Comrade Brezhnev"
in pursuit of Detente. He acknowledges Brezhnev's "his-
toric trips to the US, France, and Cuba." He admits the
legitamacy of "Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence
with states with different social systems," and "advocates
the resolution of unsettled problems by negotiation (62:E8)."
But on the other hand, the Admiral always stops short. He
never quite buys the whole "Dentente package." One common,
consistent, unequivocal theme runs through every public
statement that he renders: the Soviet people and the Soviet
Armed Forces must vigilantly guard against the aggressions
of international capitialism. The enemy may change his
tactics for the short term, but he is the enemy all the
same until he is "utterly defeated." This is Admiral
Gorshkov' s "bottom line."
In summary, Admiral Gorshkov views the political
arena as one of intense dialectic conflict between socialism
and capitialism. He perceives the US as basically hostile,
and the US Navy as the most flexible projection of that
hostility. The Admiral has emphasized ideology in recent
years, but his basic views of political life have not




2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization
of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can
Gorshkov be optimistic on this score?
Admiral Gorshkov has always been confident of the
ultimate triumph of communism, and of the expansion of
Soviet sea power. He constantly speaks of the historic
traditions of the Soviet Navy (58:E3). He points to com-
munism's "victorious procession around the planet (^6:19)."
He asserts that historical experience has proven the correct
foresight of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and the infallible
interpretation of that doctrine by the Communist Party (2^:2)
Gorshkov interprets that "The sum effect of the
Great Fatherland War was to produce a fundamental change
in the balance of power in the international arena, and that
change favors socialism (2^:15)." He quotes Brezhnev as
stating that World War II "signified the victory of progress
over reaction, humanism over barbarity, and the victory
of socialism over the obscuration of imperialism. This vic-
tory opened up the path for an upsurge in the revolutionary
struggle of the working class, the unprecedented scale of
the national liberation movement, and the downfall of the
shameful colonial system (109 :V^)." However, Admiral
Gorshkov hastens to add "that although world imperialism
was weakened, it did not abandon its objective--the de-
struction of communism (109 :V^)."
In spite of the ever-present danger of imperialism,
Gorshkov admonishes "that there are no forces in the world
^3

capable of pulling down socialism, of bringing to their
knees the. people who are tied to the ideals of Marxism-
Leninism, devoted to the socialist Motherland, and solid
in their support of Lenin's Party. This is the stern warning
to the imperialist aggressor, the stern lesson of history
(49s9)-"
Gorshkov believes that the key to the victory of
world-wide communism lies in the "leadership and primacy
of the Communist Party (93:223)." Of course, he means
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He continues his
argument, "As required by its position as the first social-
ist country in the world," the Soviet Armed Forces represents
the defensive shield of the entire socialist community
against imperialist encroachment. (Brezhnev Doctrine.)
The Admiral contends that the Soviet Navy is the most flexi-
ble component of the Soviet Armed Forces in fulfilling
this fraternal, international mission. In 1973 » Admiral
Gorshkov forecast that the "Future growth in the power of
our navy will be characterized by an intensification of its
international mission (101:64)." The Admiral thus completes
the circle of his argument. He links the victory of world-
wide communism with the international mission of the Soviet
Navy.
Admiral Gorshkov has reason to be optimistic about
the prospects of realizing his goals for communism and his
Navy. In 1955 i the Navy was fourth in prestige among the
four main branches of the Soviet Armed Forces. By his
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own account, the Soviet Navy now vies for first position
among the five main branches of the Armed Forces. Gorshkov
has carefully nurtured the prestige of the Soviet Navy
until it now shares the title of "main deterrent shield of
the socialist community" with the Strategic Rocket Forces.
In terms of strategic survivability (99s 63) and the ability
to project international influence, Admiral Gorshkov has
reason to believe that the Soviet Navy may soon stand alone
as "first among equals" in the Soviet Armed Forces.
But even as captialism threatens to destroy com-
munism, the perceptive Admiral recognizes that complacency
can lay the seeds for the decline of Soviet Naval prestige.
Admiral Gorshkov constantly admonishes and inspires his Navy
to feats of ever- increasing dedication and perfection through
the use of critical self-analysis and socialist competition,
He is well aware that as capitalism presents a catastrophic
threat to communism, complacency can be an equally insidious
enemy to the development of Soviet sea power. The Admiral
constantly strives to avert such unpleasant eventualities.
In summary, Admiral Gorshkov is optimistic about
the future of communism and the expansion of Soviet Naval
prestige and power. He contends that the dual threat of
capitalism and complacency can be defeated through vigilance,
dedication, critical self-analysis, and last, but not least,
through the inspired leadership of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union.
^5

3. Is the -political universe predictable? In what
sense and to what extent?
Admiral Gorshkov accepts the strong determinist
streak which runs through Marxist philosophy. He believes
in the "ultimate triumph of communism." He believes that
the Soviet Union is and always will be "the first country
of socialism." As early as 1955* Admiral Gorshkov pre-
dicted that the Soviet Union would be a great naval power
(2:CC5)' These kinds of events are deterministic, pre-
dictable, and absolute. However, the path and time table
for the achievement of these goals is not predictable.
Gorshkov rationalizes this indeterminant component
of his belief system by strong reliance on the inspired
"leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party," the scientific basis of Lenin's principles of Mili-
tary Science (93:223-22^), and modern operational research-
techniques employing the latest forecasting techniques
through the use of computers (^1:20). By utilizing this
triumverate, Admiral Gorshkov hopes to reduce uncertainty,
and to "expedite" the historical process.
The Admiral firmly believes that whether faced with
the problem of naval expansion or wars of national libera-
tion, only the Communist Party can make the correct inter-
pretation of events in order to assure success. In the
case of the Navy, "it (CPSU) is required to analyze every
primary achievement and trend in the development of a
technical idea, to identify the role of the Navy within
k6

the overall system of the Armed Forces of the Soviet
Government, and to make a comprehensive assessment of the
nation's economic resources. Only the Party could take
on all that (2^:18)."
Gorshkov believes that careful analysis can negate
forecasting error. He quotes Lenin as saying that "Every
battle includes the possibility of defeat, and there is no
other means of reducing this possibility than to organize
the preparation of the battle (93 s 22*0." Gorshkov is a
strong advocate of planning and organization. Further, once
he has formulated a plan, he requires that it be pursued
and executed with utmost discipline. "To slip or lose
your head, is to lose everything (93*22*0.
"
Admiral Gorshkov stresses the continuous advance
of the military-technical revolution (89s 20). He announces
the importance of keeping abreast with this advance. He
tries to optimize his naval forecasts through new qualita-
tive measuring techniques (89*19)* through analyzing the
capabilities of the enemy and borrowing from them where
necessary (93:223) i and by developing massive fleet exer-
cises which resemble combat operations to the fullest extent
possible (9^*55) • But in spite of these comprehensive
procedures, the Admiral still acknowledges the primacy of
the CPSU in all forecasting matters.
In summary, Admiral Gorshkov believes that he can
predict that final outcome of his Party and Navy with great
accuracy, but he cannot predict the path or time-table of
^7

these ends with as high a degree of confidence. Gorshkov
is a bold exponent of the scientific method as a problem
solving technique. He contends that well-calculated, de-
cisive action can expedite the historical process. With
the patronage of the Communist Party, the support of
"Lenin's Industrial Program," and the "correct measure of
naval effectiveness," Admiral Gorshkov believes that he
has been able to interpret the most correct path for Soviet
naval expansion. With these methods, the Admiral has been
able to "predict and expedite" the historical process.
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k. How much control or mastery can one have over
historical development ?
Throughout his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of
the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov often has cited the con-
tributions of Marx, Lenin, Krushchev, and Brezhnev as actors
who controlled and advanced the cause of Communism and the
Soviet Navy. Admiral Gorshkov believes that such actors
can control historical development. He contends that the
Party, and particularly its Central Committee, is the primary
source of such actors. He also believes that the Armed
Forces, and the Navy in particular, can be an important
instrument in the training and development of such political
elites. Admiral Gorshkov indicates that the Soviet Navy as
the "Vanguard of the Revolution" has a special relationship
to the Party and has been an important factor in its
development (105:2).
Admiral Gorshkov predicts that the Navy can best
improve control over its own destiny, as well as that of
the Party's, by advancing knowledge and discipline through
ideological training. "The commanding officer of a ship...
(plays a vital role in this developmental process) . . .as
the main organizer of combat training and political edu-
cation (105:2)." Gorshkov states that political training
is not only helpful to the Navy, but to socialist society
in general. "In the years of naval service the navymen
are also undergoing an efficient school of political and
cultural training. Hence, even after demobilization when
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returning to peaceful work, they continue to imitate the
glorious naval traditions and by stubborn work at con-
struction sites and in collective farms, at the factories
and plants, are obtaining the right to be in the foremost
ranks of the builders of communism (35jCC?)."
Groshkov praises the special relationship of the
Komsomol and the Navy as the primary source of ideological
vigor. He characterizes the qualities derived from Komsomol
membership as : "Political consciousness, discipline, and
crystal clear honesty. .. (33 sCC3) . " He takes great pride
in the fact the "Nine out of ten sailors are Komsomol mem-
bers or communists. They are ready for new daring, for new
exploits on behalf of the Socialist Fatherland (33:CC3)."
The relationship between the Komsomol and the Soviet Navy
is a major theme in 20fo of Gorshkov' s statements. Gorshkov
measures the "morale and team spirit" of a ship's crew by
their political consciousness (105:^). And Admiral Gorshkov
believes that discipline and political consciousness can
be developed best through organizations like the Komsomol.
As a full member of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party, Gorshkov envisions himself as a part of
the "guiding light of Soviet destiny." In the mid 1950' s,
it was "the Central Committee of our Party (which) defined
the path of fleet development, as well as the fleet's
role and place in the system of the Armed Forces in the
country. The course taken was one which required the con-
struction of an oceangoing fleet, capable of carrying our
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offensive strategic missions (4l*19)." Gorshkov sees the
Central Committee of the Communist Party as the chief
directorate of Soviet policy; whether that policy relates
to control of the military or the government. The "Central
Committee" theme is vital to Gorshkov' s operational code,
and appears in SS'fo of all his public statements.
In summary, Admiral Gorshkov believes that dedicated,
disciplined actors from within the Communist Party can "move"
history. He believes that the Party is the source of all
such actors, and that the Central Committee of the CPSU
is the vehicle by which such actors can direct communist
advancement. Further, the Admiral visualizes the Navy as
an excellent training ground for the education and develop-
ment of the future "leaders and builders of communism."
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5' What is the role of chance in human affairs and in
historical development?
Admiral Gorshkov discounts the role of chance in
human affairs. He admits that "political opportunities "--
e.g. wars of national liberation—will present themselves,
but that the "perfect" communist decision process will have
ready alternatives for such contingencies. Gorshkov be-
lieves that "all politically important events are explainable
under the laws of Marxism and Leninism." He also believes
that it is the main task of the Party leadership to systemat-
ically interpret these laws in order to determine the
"correct path" for communist advancement. Gorshkov contends
that the Party must develop a well-defined position on all
issues. To do less, and to try to "muddle through," is
to court disaster (93*224) . Chance has no place in this
process.
Gorshkov affirms that the Soviet analytic process
(dialectical materialism) is responsive to the dynamic
state of the political universe, provides the most precise
methods for developing Soviet interests, and counteracts
the continuing plots and intrigues of capitalism.
Gorshko.v believes that the best way to advance
Soviet naval science is to reduce uncertainty through well-
articulated plans and strategies. He states that "Soviet
naval science, which is based on a uniquely scientific
methodolgical base, that of dialectical materialism, is
completely responsive to the fleet's material technical
52

base. .. (41:21) . " Gorshkov advocates a planning process
whose "primary requirement ... (is) that of maintaining all
branches of naval science at the level of the latest
achievements of science and technology (41:21)."
If chance plays no part in Gorshkov* s perception
of the Soviet planning process, then neither does it play
a significant role in his perception of his opponent's
actions. He constantly points to the aggressive "plans
and calculations" of the imperialists. In the "Navies in
War and Peace" series, Gorshkov speaks of World War I as
a capitalist "plan" to redivide the world (92:47). He
describes US "plans" for expansion in Latin American, Africa,
and Asia (94:48). He outlines German "plans" for the prepar-
ation of World War II, and exposes the capitalist plot
for directing German aggression against the USSR (94:48)
.
He warns of US plans for massive exploitation of the
world's oceans (99*56) . Behind every capitalist action,
there is a sinister, well-formulated strategy.
In summary, Admiral Gorshkov discounts the role
of chance in either the affairs of the Soviet Union or
its enemies. He believes that political uncertainty can
be reduced by reliance on planning for all alternatives,
through the broad application of dialectical materialism,




B. THE INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS OF GORSHKOV 'S OPERATIONAL CODE
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or
objectives for political action?
Admiral Gorshkov has demonstrated remarkable suc-
cess in espousing the military line within the Communist
Party. He has been particularly effective in selecting
"objectively possible" goals for the Navy. Gorshkov has
been required to select goals which satisfy the needs of
both the Central Committee leadership and the General Staff.
The Admiral's selection process advocates the pursuit of
graduated objectives leading to an optimum goal, while
avoiding "political adventures."
The selection of graduated objectives creates a
dilemma between Admiral Gorshkov' s view of the ultimate
victory of communism and the choice of the most immediate
means of achieving that goal. On the one hand, the Admiral
advocates the rapid exploitation of all opportunities
which will advance the Party or the Navy. But on the other
hand, he is enough of a realist to discern that many
"opportunities" also possess the "opportunity" for disaster.
In order to solve this dilemma, the Admiral has developed
a strategy which sets an optimum goal, but whose methodology
is integrated through a series of well-calculated, incre-
mental steps. The political concept of "salami slicing"
is an excellent characterization of Gorshkov* s goal
selection process. An example of his goal selection
strategy in action is the manner in which he expanded the
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prestige of the Navy within the Soviet Armed Forces. This
process is explained in detail in Instrumental Belief #2.
Admiral Gorshkov views the Communist Party as the
final arbiter of the selection and priority of Soviet
political goals . He quotes Lenin as saying "Policy is the
reason, while war (military) is only the instrument,
and not the opposite. Consequently, it only remains to
subordinate the military point of view to the political
(89:20)." But as the good politician that he is, Admiral
Gorshkov constantly emphasizes those "Party goals" which
best advance the cause of the Navy. An example of such
support is the manner in which the Admiral lauds the "inter-
national mission of communism." It is more than coincidence
that he perceives the Soviet Navy as "fulfill (ing) an
important role as an instrument of state policy in peace-
time. .
.
(as well as) . . .a powerful factor for building com-
munism. . .and strengthing international security (99*66)."
The Admiral advocates a policy of selecting goals
which are "objectively possible" (Lenin's definition), but
balances this optimism with three important admonitions:
1) never underestimate the enemy, 2) avoid adventures, and
3) consider long-term risks.
Admiral Gorshkov* s optimizing strategy is bounded
by the injunction against engaging in operations that
overestimate one's own strength or underestimate the
strength of the enemy. Such actions fail "to take into
account the objective laws" of Lenin's Principles of
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Military Strategy (93:223). "Everyone agrees that the
conduct of an army (navy) which does not train itself to
master all forms of weaponry, and all means and devises
of combat which an adversary has or could have is foolish
or even criminal (93 '• 223)."
Gorshkov states that "the principles of strategy--
the study of the strong and weak points of the enemy, pre-
dicting his intentions, activeness and daring, purposeful
-
ness and flexibility in plans... and the decisive moment
for action" should be constantly updated and refined
(93:22*0. The Admiral points out that in an effort to
"possess the requisite knowledge to skillfully combat a
strong enemy," it may become necessary to "borrow. . .in-
dividual elements and achievements of the bourgeois art
of war (93 :22^) . " To minimize any of these principles is
to limit your capability to defeat imperialist aggression.
A second injunction against the optimizing strategy
is the avoidance of adventures. Krushchev's "Caribbean
Crisis" falls in this category. An "adventure" is any
action which foregoes the graduated objectives approach
and which may lead to severe losses if unsuccessful. The
payoffs for an adventure are limited to maximum gain or
maximum loss. Admiral Gorshkov has carefully avoided such
action in either the political development of the prestige
of his Navy, or in the procurement of naval weapon systems.
A final injunction of the optimizing strategy is a
warning against allowing one's decisions to be based on
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short term gains to the exclusion of considerations of
long term risk or cost. In short, the "material- technical
base must be able to support desired goals." Programs must
be matched with capability in a realistic manner. The
"small war" theory debate of the mid-1920* s in the Soviet
Union is an example of a major conflict over the validity
of this last injunction (^1:2-3). Admiral Gorshkov stated
that "the adherents of building a large surfact fleet were
out of touch with the material and technical base avail-




2. How are goals of action pursued most effectively?
Admiral Gorshkov divides his method of pursuing
goals into two categories: the pursuit of goals in war,
and the pursuit of goals in peace. Peaceful, political
goals will be considered first.
Admiral Gorshkov pursues political goals in the
same evolutionary way in which he selects them. Once a
goal has been established, the Admiral will press forward
with "cautious aggression" in effecting the goal. He is
very aware of the political limits of his power, and always
endeavors to secure support before pressing on with the
task at hand. If the Admiral selects his goals in a
graduated manner, then he pursues these gradations in an
incremented fashion.
This description may appear to characterize the
Admiral as meek and reserved; nothing could be farther from
the truth. Gorshkov pursues his goals in an aggressive
and dynamic manner, but he has learned the vagaries of the
Soviet political system well. In order to achieve one's
goals, one must create a political power base to support
those goals. Once this legitimatizing process has been
completed, maximum energy can be exerted in attaining the
established objectives.
An interesting example of the necessity for es-
tablishing political support is shown in Gorshkov* s early
writing. During the Krushchev era, 1955-1965 • Gorshkov
utilized Krushchev's name to legitimatize his own policy
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statements. Krushchev appears in 39$ of all Gorshkov's
statements during this early period. Brezhnev, on the
other hand, appears in only l6fo of Gorshkov's statements
since 1965-
This disparity points to two interesting facts.
First, Gorshkov employs the name of the General Secretary
in order to legitimatize policy statements. Second, once
the Admiral had gained a sufficiently broad base of
political support, he no longer perceived it necessary to
"stamp" every policy statement with the General Secretary's
name. Gorshkov still perceives political legitimacy as
an important factor in pursuing goals (Note: he often
uses Brezhnev's name when referring to the international
mission of the Navy) , but political support is most vital
when either new to leadership circles, or when engaging
in pursuit of controversial objectives. In any event,
Admiral Gorshkov believes that political support is a
necessary , but not sufficient condition in the effective
pursuit of goals.
An analogy can be drawn between Gorshkov's method
of pursuing goals and blowing up an elastic balloon. So
long as even, steady pressure is applied slowly in all
directions, the balloon will expand fully. But if the
surface of the balloon is weak in one area (an uneven
power base), or if too much pressure is applied too quickly
in one direction, then the balloon will explode and all
goals will be lost. So it is with Gorshkov's process
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of "cautious aggression" in the pursuit of political
goals.
An excellent example of Admiral Gorshkov' s pursuit
of peaceful goals is the manner in which he nurtured and
developed the prestige of the Soviet Navy. In I960, the
Soviet Navy ranked fifth in prestige among the Soviet
Armed Forces (116:60). Krushchev referred to its capital
ships as "metaleaters, " and that "such ships are good for
carrying political leaders on visits and their guns are
good for firing salutes, but not much else (116:67)."
As late as 1957 » some 20 Army officers outranked Gorshkov
(125:56). In spite of these handicaps, Admiral Gorshkov
set his sights on "the creation of a powerful navy (2:CC20)."
In the early years, Admiral Gorshkov always spoke
of the Navy in terms of "the Faithful Helper of the Army."
By 196^, Admiral Gorshkov indicated that the Navy had
achieved coequal status with the Army "shoulder to shoulder
(26:CC3)." In 1968, Admiral Gorshkov said that "the
fleet--after the Strategic Missile Troops (SRT)—became our most
important instrument for exerting decisive influence on
an armed conflict in theaters of war involving tremendous
distances (59:E5)-" By 1969i Admiral Gorshkov referred
to the Navy as "the frontier of our motherland's defense
(65:E6)." In 1970, he said that "Lenin devoted a great
amount of attention to establishing the Navy as the 'basic
unit* of the Armed Forces of our State (75:19)." In 19?li
Gorshkov announced that the Navy had achieved coequal
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status with the SRT." "Together with atomic missile sub-
marines of the Navy, the Strategic Missile Troops became
the main means of containing an aggressor and decisively
defeating him in war and became a reliable shield pro-
tecting the peaceful system of socialism (79*5) •"
Today, Admiral Gorshkov contends that the Soviet
Navy is first in prestige among the Soviet Armed Forces.
He implies this because "missile carrying submarines...
(have) great survivability in comparison v/ith land-based
launching systems, (and) are an even more effective means
of deterence (99*63)." Further, Admiral Gorshkov believes
that the Soviet Navy is the Soviet Union's "most flexible
instrument in the conduct of foreign policy."
In order to grasp the real flavor of how Admiral
Gorshkov advanced the prestige of the Soviet Navy, the
reader must survey the entire spectrum of the Admiral's
speeches from 1955 "to 197^ • If one does this, the thread
of the Admiral's methodology stands clear. First, the
Admiral gathered political support, and then he pursued his
goal in calculated, precise, incremental steps. However,
all the while, the Admiral was keenly aware of his political
limits. He continuously preached the importance of col-
laboration of all the Soviet Armed Forces. "The focus of
attention on the Navy does not in any way imply any sort
of unique importance of naval forces in armed combat. .
.
(89:21)." "We cannot place reliance on only one service
of the Armed Forces. (He continues) ... the main provision
61

in our military doctrine to effect a victory in a struggle
against a- strong enemy can be won only by the combined
efforts of all services of the Armed Forces and by close
coordination among them (79*5) •" The Admiral judiciously
spoke of cooperation as he prodded the Navy to the top.
Admiral Gorshkov' s pursuit of goals in war is
much more aggressive. The enemy must be pushed to the
limit and "utterly defeated." "All-out offensive operations
must be carried out right up to the complete rout of the
enemy (93:224)." "Surprise attacks, and seizing and main-
taining the initiative" is essential (93:224)." "The
battle for the 'first salvo' is taking on special
meaning in naval battle and under present day conditions.
Delay in the employment of weapons (including nuclear) in
a naval battle or operations will be fraught with the most
serious and even fatal consequences ... (99 s 63-64) . " But
even in war, the Admiral concedes that "it is wise to know
when to stop." As Lenin warns, "the art of retreat must
be mastered as well." Gorshkov states that the Navy must
"intelligently combine defense and offense, depending on
the situation (93:224),"
In summary, Admiral Gorshkov pursues his goals
according to their nature. Peacetime, political goals must
be pursued in an even, integrated manner with "cautious
aggression;" ensuring all the while that adequate political
support is maintained. Wartime goals may be pursued more
vigorously, but even in war one "must know when to stop."
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3. How are risks of political action calculated, con-
trolled, and accepted?
Admiral Gorshkov recognizes that certain precipitous
actions such as nuclear war, or direct confrontation with
the US could initiate the annihilation of the Soviet Union
and his Navy. He contends, however, that a strong defense
linked with a policy of peaceful coexistence will reduce
the risks of such an eventuality. The Admiral believes
that major goals can be pursued with "limited, graduated
means." He recognizes that these means must be controlled
carefully or else a given situation could escalate into
catastrophe. However, all acceptable risks must be borne
in order to advance the cause of communism and the Soviet
Navy.
Gorshkov admits that "the atomic mushroom clouds
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed that a powerful means
of destruction had appeared which unavoidably demands a
serious re -examination of the doctrines on carrying on
war (2^:17)." He refers to this era as "the revolution
of nuclear weapons." And he goes on to state that the
Soviet Union developed a "unity of views" on the use of
nuclear weapons in order to deal with this new phase of
warfare
.
The Admiral warns that "anyone who encrouches on
the USSR and the states friendly to it is in for a crushing
retaliatory blow (13:BB11)." He quotes Defense Minister
Malinovskiy "who declared that the USSR is capable of
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razing from the face of the earth with one rocket-nuclear
blow any targets, all the industrial and administrative-
political centers of the United States, and destroying
whole countries which lend their territories for the
American military bases ringing the USSR and other socialist
countries (13:BB11)."
Gorshkov strongly believes that the deterrent pos-
ture of the Soviet strategic forces reduces the risk of
nuclear war, and that Soviet nuclear forces "have become
a serious argument which even the most serious advocates
of unleasing a new world nuclear rocket war. . .must consider
(19:28)."
In spite of such saber-rattling as "atomic mushroom
clouds" and "crushing retaliatory blows," Gorshkov per-
ceives that "this does not mean that such a war is unavoid-
able (2^:26)." "It is possible to avert a new world war"
through the defensive might of the Soviet Union as "was
graphically demonstrated during the period of acute exac-
erbation in the international situation that occurred in
the Caribbean Sea area (2^:26)."
The Admiral asks the rhetorical question: "What
can the alternative to multilateral nuclear forces be? It
is well known! It is the policy of peaceful coexistence...
(28:5)." "The Soviet Union steadfastly and consistently
defends the cause of peace and security of peoples and
Lenin* s principles of peaceful coexistence of states with
different social systems; and it advocates the resolution
6k

of unsettled problems by negotiation (62:E8)." The "peace
program of the 2^-th Congress" (Detente) is an extension of
the Soviet pursuit of peace (109:V5)
.
If Admiral Gorshkov admits that nuclear war carries
excessive risks, and only can be avoided through deterrence
and peaceful coexistence, then how can communism advance
its goals in the conflict environment of the international
arena? The answer is found through the controlled use of
"limited means" to obtain optimum goals.
The Admiral has great confidence that "situations"
can be controlled if a "salami-slicing" approach is used.
This incremental scheme produces minimum risks while pro-
viding steady progress toward the ultimate goal. Two
examples of this process in action are national wars of
liberation indirectly supported by the Soviet Union, and
the manner in which the Admiral incrementally developed the
position of the Navy within the Soviet Armed Forces.
Admiral Gorshkov perceives the Soviet Navy as the
most effective "limited means" force that the Soviet Union
possesses. Navies can "achieve political goals without
resorting to military operations by merely threatening to
initiate them (98:59)." "The role of a navy is not
limited to the execution of important missions in armed
combat. (A Navy)... has always been an instrument of policy...
and an important support for diplomacy in peacetime owing
to its inherent qualities which permit it to a greater
degree than other branches of the armed forces to exert
65

pressure on potential enemies without the direct em-
ployment of weaponry (98:59)."
In order to calculate the size of the "salami
slices," Admiral Gorshkov falls back on Lenin's Principles
of Strategy. This calculation system calls for "the study
of the strong and weak points of the enemy, predicting
his intentions, activeness and daring, purposefulness and
flexibility in plans, the creation of superiority of forces
and means in the main sectors, the correct determination
of the most dangerous grouping at a given moment, and de-
cisiveness of action (93s 22*0." If these principles are
followed, limited means can be calculated which will obtain
the desired goal without the dangers of escalation. Admiral
Gorshkov stresses the importance of limiting the means and
not the objective. This philosophy contrasts with the US
experience in Korea and Vietnam of "limiting the objective."
Admiral Gorshkov speaks of "the unprecedented
scale of the national liberation movement (109* V*0." But
he recognizes also that the imperialists react to this
movement through "the unleasing of numerous local wars...
(in order) to direct the development of the events in the
world arena (109"V*O • " "Therefore, local wars can be
regarded as a manifestation of the more determined im-
perialist methods for acting against the movement for
national independence and progress (99:63)." Admiral
Gorshkov recognizes the danger to the Soviet Union if they
directly participate in this local wars. "Under certain
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circumstances such actions carry with them the threat
of escalation into world war (99s 63)."
From an analysis of Gorshkov's remarks concerning
the calculation, control, and acceptance of political
risks, a summary shows: 1) that no action should be
initiated which could destroy the Communist Party or the
Soviet Navy as a viable entity, 2) a political situation
can be controlled with the use of incremented, limited
means: e.g. arms shipments, naval shows-of-force , economic
pressure, etc., 3) there are viable alternatives to the
risks of nuclear war: e.g. peaceful coexistence, Detente,
negotiation, etc., k) Lenin's Principles of Strategy are
employed in the calculation of the "size of the salami
slices," 5) Soviet participation in local wars must be
controlled carefully because of the inherent danger of
local wars escalating into general war, and 6) an admonition
to undertake all acceptable risks in order to advance the
cause of communism.
^. What is the best "timing" of action to advance
one's interest?
Admiral Gorshkov favors graduated, yet purposeful
pursuit of interests. Such a belief excludes either
procrastination or precipitous action. The Admiral be-
lieves that action should be timed according to the nature
of the situation. In v/ar, the battle for the first salvo
is critical; whereas in peace, the pursuit of political
goals must be timed according to political support.
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Gorshkov contends that there are certain "opportunities"
which must be pursued immediately, but that the Communist
Party alone determines the timing of such actions.
As goals are distinguished according to their
nature, so is timing distinguished according to the situ-
ation. In war, the Admiral speaks of quick, aggressive
action. He points to the importance of initiative (105O) »
surprise (93: 224), and the "Battle for the first salvo
(99563)." He constantly invokes the necessity of readiness
to respond to imperialist aggression. Gorshkov states
that "the first moments of battle in modern warfare go a
long way to determining the final outcome." Any "delay...
(will lead) to serious and even fatal consequences (99*64).
"
In peace, the Admiral is willing to wait for his
victories. He believes in the careful calculation of the
best means to affect a goal, and he recognizes the im-
portance of obtaining a base of political support. Once
these two objectives have been accomplished, the Admiral
does not wish to reduce their effectiveness by either delay
or precipitous action. Admiral Gorshkov is "deterministic"
enough to be confident of the ultimate success of his
programs and those of the Party. He is willing to bide
his time, if need be.
5- What is the utility and role of different means
for advancing one's interest?
Admiral Gorshkov believes that all means are
legitimate for advancing the interests of the Party and
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the Soviet Navy. He advocates the simultaneous use of
many diverse means to solve a problem. Where force fails,
then the extended threat of force or hostile rhetoric
might succeed. Other options which might contribute to
the Soviet cause are: propaganda, negotiation, compromise,
peaceful coexistence, wars of national liberation, economic
sanctions, etc... Each of these methods might have utility
in a specific situation.
An example of the use of many means for advancing
a cause is the way in which the Soviet Union advances the
Brezhnev Doctrine. Because of the USSR's preeminent
position within the Socialist Block, the Soviet Union
claims a special responsibility for ensuring the security
of the Socialist Community from "imperialist corruption."
Some of the different means that the Admiral has enumerated
that the USSR employs are: 1) "the wise leadership of the
CPSU," 2) "the Socialist economic system," 3) "the socio-
political unity of Socialist society," k) "the close
cohesion of the people of the Army and the Navy around
communists," and 5) "Socialist Patriotism and Proletarian
Internationalism (62:E8)." Gorshkov notes the significance
of the support and "international ties... of the WARSAW
Pact countries (101:6^-)." He recognizes the importance
of balance and integration among all the Soviet Armed
Forces "cemented into a single monolith by the will of
the Party (107:2^-)." The Admiral even sees a place for
the transformation of enemy tactics and strategy into the
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Soviet security system (99:223) . Gorshkov perceives an
important role for each of these many elements in securing
the ideological integrity of the Soviet Block.
Another example of a "multiplicity of means to
fulfill an interest" is the approach Gorshkov uses to
attain his goal of a "Soviet sea power second to none."
In fulfilling this goal, the Admiral stresses the need for
"balanced development of forces of the ocean-going Navy. .
.
capable of carrying out tasks confronting them (99:66)."
While the "basic unit of the Navy is the submarine," there
are "needs for various other types of (aircraft and) surface
ships (99:63)." The Admiral finds a definite place for
missile carrying submarines and ASW submarines; a require-
ment for long-range missile carrying aircraft and ASW
patrol aircraft; the need for amphibious ships and their
attendant marine assault forces; the utility of oceanographic/
research ships, fishing trawlers, and merchant ships. Naval
forces can provide force, presence, and project the foreign
policy initiatives of the CPSU. Oceanographic, fishing,
and merchant ships can penetrate foreign areas economically,
and can provide important intelligence information. Each
of these diverse elements plays a useful and specific role
in the Admiral's plan for balanced, integrated Soviet sea
power.
Gorshkov, like Lenin, contends that there are no
illicit means for advancing communism or the Navy. The
outcome of a struggle with capitalism will not only depend
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on the Armed Forces, but "on the entire people in the
broadest sense of the word (93s 223)."
C. • MODIFICATION TO ADMIRAL GORSHKOV'S OPERATIONAL CODE
Admiral Gorshkov's operational code has not changed
significantly during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy. His basic goals for the Navy and his relentless
pursuit of these goals has remained constant. The Ad-
miral's view of the enemy and his perception of the political
arena is essentially the same now as it was in 1955- In
short, Admiral Gorshkov's philosophic and instrumental
beliefs have not altered over time or under different
leaderships.
The emphasis which Admiral Gorshkov has placed on cer-
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in emphasis do not reflect changes in a basic instrumental
or philosophic belief. Several theme categories may
combine to form a single belief. Thus, there is a very
complex relationship between theme categories and operational
beliefs.
In any event, the results listed in Appendix A. por-
tray the major themes that command Admiral Gorshkov's
attention, and the corresponding importance which he has
attached to these theme categories over time. It must be
noted again that modification to theme emphasis does not
correlate directly to modification of an operational code.
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Examples of the consistency of Admiral Gorshkov's
operational code are indicated in the public statements
listed "below. The reader should note the similarity of
themes during the Krushchev era (1955-1965) with those
of the Brezhnev period (1965-I974)
.
1. The enemy is hostile...
(1958) "The reactionary forces of imperialism, blinded
by their wild hatred against socialism, are preparing
a new military aggression against the camp of peace and
democracy (6:3)."
(1959) "The basic source of war remains the aggressive
course of American imperialism (9:CC7)."
(197^) "As in former times, the blade of the policies of
aggressive imperialist circles in a number of countries
is still raised over socialist countries, over nations
that have selected a progressive road of developments
(107:25)."
2. Ultimately, Communism will triumph...
(I963) "World War II produced a fundamental change in the
balance of power in. the international arena in favor of
socialism (2^:15) ."
(1969) "No force in the world is capable of crushing
socialism and forcing to their knees people loyal to the




(197*0 "The routing of Hitlerite Germany. .. signified the




3< The Party uses science, technology, and dialectical
materialism to determine future goals...
(1958) "In the postwar years the Navy has continuously
developed itself on a new technological basis.
(1967) "Soviet naval science, which is based on uniquely
scientific methodological base, that of dialectical
materialism (41:21)."
(1973) There is "a dialectical relationship between the
development of naval forces and the state goals which
they are intended to serve (89:20)."
4. The Party controls historical development. .
.
(1956) "...the historic decision of the 20th Congress (3:CC3)."
(1959) "21st CPSU Congress. . .the entrance to the all-out
construction of a communist society (9jCC8),"
(1971) "The decisions adopted by the 2^th CPSU Congress
have served to create new and unprecedented horizons on
all fields of social development (81:1)."
5. Chance has no place in human affairs: everything
is planned. .
.
(1958) "The present international situation requires
even more staunchness in training, and preparations for
operations
. . . (5**0 • "
(1972) "Every battle includes the possibility of defeat,
and there is no other means of reducing this possibility
than to organize the preparation of battle (93:22^)."
6. Risks must be calculated, and if they are excessive,
alternatives must be determined...
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(1963) "It is possible to avert a new world war (2^:26)."
(196^) "What can be the alternative to multilateral
nuclear forces be?... It is the policy of peaceful co-
existence (28:5)."
(1969) "The Soviet Union steadfastly and constantly de-
fends the cause of peace... and Lenin's principle's of
peaceful coexistence (62:E8)."
(1972) "Navies ... can achieve political goals without re-
sorting to military operations by merely threatening to
initiate them (98:59)."
(197^) "The Soviet Union's invariable consistency in pursuing
the peace policy was again graphically confirmed by Comrade
L.I. Brezhnev. . .relaxation of international tension...
(113 :VO."
7. Utilize all means possible to pursue goals...
(1958) "the brotherly cooperation of soldiers in all
branches of the service became one of the glorious tradi-
tions of the Soviet Armed Forces (^:2)."
(i960) "Victory in modern war can be attained only by
using all means of armed combat (11:CC10)."





(197^) "the need for... taking into account the collabora-
tion between the Army and the Navy... the principle of




D. SUMMARY OF ADMIRAL GORSHKOV S OPERATIONAL CODE
PHILOSOPHIC BELIEF SYSTEM
1. Admiral Gorshkov views the political arena to exist
in intense and perpetual conflict between socialism and
capitalism. He perceives the US as "basically hostile, and
its Navy as the primary projection of that hostility.
2. Gorshkov is optimistic about the ultimate triumph
of communism, and of the expansion of Soviet sea power.
The leadership of the Party will assure these victories, but
the threat of imperialism is ever-present.
3. Though Gorshkov is confident of the final outcome
of communism and the Navy, he cannot predict the path or
timetable of that outcome with great confidence. He be-
lieves in planning and technological forecasts. With such
techniques, and the patronage of the CPSU, Gorshkov states
that uncertainties can be reduced and the "most correct"
path chosen.
k. The Admiral perceives that dedicated, disciplined
members of the CPSU can advance the cause of the Party and,
hence, the Navy. He contends that the Party is the source
of all such actors, and that the Navy provides an excellent
training ground for the "builders of communism."
5. Chance has no place in human affairs: either those
of the USSR or its opponents . All important events can
be explained under the laws of Marx and Lenin. Planning






1. Goals must be selected through a process of gradu-
ated objectives which lead to the optimum goal. This
"salami slicing" approach must be aggressive and optimizing,
but bounded by injunctions against underestimating the
enemy, participating in "adventures," or discounting long
term risks for short term gains
.
2. Goals should be pursued according to their nature.
Peaceful, political goals should be pursued in an even,
integrated manner, ensuring the maintenance of adequate
political support. Wartime goals may be pursued vigorously,
but with the limit of "knowing when to stop."
3. Risks must be calculated by the CPSU. No venture
should be undertaken which could lead to the certain de-
struction of the Party or the Navy. Optimum goals can be
achieved with "limited means." Local v/ars have the in-
herent danger of escalation. And finally, all acceptable
risks must be taken in order to advance communism/Navy.
^. Procrastination or precipitous action are to be
avoided. Timing must be determined according to the
situation. In war, the "battle for the first salvo" is
critical. In peace, goals must be "timed" with political
support.
5. All means are legitimate for advancing the interests
of the Party and the Navy. A diverse, yet integrated and





E. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
A basic criticism of the operational code construct
is whether the code is sharp enough to differentiate
between individuals who claim similar ideological beliefs.
How fine must the input be in order to obtain the desired
output? The Operational Code of the Politburo used the
writings of Stalin and Lenin as input, but its output dealt
with a bureaucratic group and not specific individuals.
Operational codes have been written about former Secretary
of State Rusk (130) and Senator Frank Church (131), but
these codes were derived composites of public statements
and personal interviews. The real question is: Is the
"mesh" of the operational code system fine enough to depict
unique, specific, individual traits without the benefit
of face-to-face contact? Can public statements alone pro-
vide enough grist for the operational code mill? If so,
can the operational code of Admiral Gorshkov be distinguished
from that of Marshall Grechko? Or even more pointedly,
can the Gorshkov code be separated from that of Admiral
Kasatonov?
A definitive answer to these inquiries is not yet
available. It is the subject of further research. But
partial answers to these questions follow. First, Admiral
Gorshkov°s code can be distinguished from Marshal Grechko's
code because Admiral Gorshkov' s code has now been written,
and Grechko's has not. This "answer" at first appears
flippant and simplistic, but it points to a very important
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fact: the operational code construct has not been widely
used. The true accuracy and effectiveness of the oper-
ational code will not be measured until a reasonable sample
of codes on Soviet military elites has been formulated.
Soviet elites present an interesting challenge to the
operational code because Soviets so often must be studied
exclusively by their public communications. The Gorshkov
code is an important first step. As Alexander George
commented, the operational code has been a neglected analy-
tical system (123) • But the Gorshkov code demonstrates
that this methodology offers possibilities for systematic
analysis where none had existed before.
Second, this particular exercise is limited to an
analysis of Admiral Gorshkov' s public statements and, hence,
his public role . Public statements cause an impediment in
"getting to the core" of an actor. This author believes
that there is a high correlation between the Admiral's
public and private views, but the quantification of this
relationship is presently impractical. If a valid system
could be developed which would clearly indicate the de-
pendence of public statements on private views, then the
operational code of Admiral Gorshkov could more clearly
reflect his personal character. To date, the linkage be-
tween Admiral Gorshkov' s public and private views/roles
must remain another area for future research.
Third, a comparison between Admiral Gorshkov*
s
operational code and that of the Politburo in 1951 can
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be drawn and the differences noted. This exercise is
weakened -by the time domain differences of the two codes
(1955 "to 197^ vs. 1951) » but the comparison can be in-
structive nonetheless. Admiral Gorshkov perceives the
US Navy as the primary means of the projection of US
hostility toward the USSR. The Politburo, for its part,
did not specifically characterize the US Navy as the prime
US threat. Next, Admiral Gorshkov is a staunch supporter
of technological forecasting, operations research, and
planning and projections based on carefully controlled
combat training and exercises. The Politburo placed much
greater emphasis on ideological considerations than does
the Admiral, and it stressed the political determinants
of the decision process rather than advanced systems ap-
proaches. Admiral Gorshkov is more conservative in his
goal selection process than was the Politburo. The Admiral
deals in the art-of-the-possible , and selects only those
objectives which have a high probability of being attained.
In this area, he is much more pragmatic than the Politburo.
Finally, if the Admiral appears constrained in the selec-
tion of his goals, quite the opposite is the case for the
manner in which he pursues them. The Admiral has a ten-
dency to error on the side of precipitous action. This
tendency should not be overdramaticized, but it does appear
in a careful reading of Gorshkov 1 s rhetoric. The Admiral
is a skilled, disciplined, astute politician who recognizes
the lobbying power of the other branches of the Armed
79

Forces, but his public support for Naval causes has, at
times by Western standards, approached fanatical dimen-
sions. Such an approach may have merit in war, but it is
bound to cause political anxiety in the Ministry of
Defense in peace.
In summary, Admiral Gorshkov's operational code may
favor a description of his role playing rather than provide
insight into his innermost convictions. But such a short-
coming appears to be a fundamental limitation of the
operational code construct when analyzing an actor's belief
system without the benefit of private discourse. The total
validity and effectiveness of the operational code will
only be realized when a broad spectrum of military elite
codes have been compared and scrutinized. The Gorshkov
code can be compared with The Operational Code of the Polit-
buro in a limited way in order to determine the differences
of Admiral Gorshkov's application of Soviet ideology to-
day and its bureaucratic interpretation in 1951- Finally,
many areas remain for futher research in the operational
code methodology. One noteworthy area is the requirement
for a system which will derive specific, individual char-
acteristics from an input limited to public communications.
A linkage model must be developed which will quantify the
relationships between important public and private com-
munications variables. An interim solution to part of
these quandries is the in-depth thematic analysis approach






In analyzing the Gorshkov material, it became readily
apparent that several main themes persisted throughout his
statements. For the purposes of this research, a main
theme was defined as a major point or significant ob-
jective of a particular piece of communication. The term
significant was and is a difficult quality to grasp, but a
limited emersion in the data quickly eliminated this trouble-
some conceptual problem. The coder reliability figures
delineated in Section III attest to this fact.
Each individual theme within each document of the
entire sample was analyzed in the following manner. First,
the theme categories were defined and separated. Second,
related themes were grouped under main category headings
.
Third, the date of the first instance of a particular theme
category was indicated. The date of the last appearance of
a theme category was also indicated if significant: e.g. the
last reference to Krushchev was important, as was the date
of the first individual reference to Brezhnev. The lack
of appearance of certain important facts was also signifi-
cant; such as the complete exclusion of Stalin's name from
all 113 documents! Fourth, the number of appearances for
each individual theme was extracted from the coding sheets
and tabulated. Recall that for an individual document, a
theme category was either listed present or not. Multiple
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listings of a given theme within a single document were
disallowed. Fifth, a statistical analysis was made of
the theme category's frequency of appearance over the
entire sample and as distributed during the Krushchev and
Brezhnev years. Sixth, any significant background infor-
mation was collected from the context in which the themes
appeared. Seventh, all pertinent comments relating to the
application of a particular theme to Admiral Gorshkov's
operational code were recorded. And eighth, representative
quotations of each individual theme category were enumerated.
This entire process was rigorously and systematically applied
to each and every document, and to each and every theme
category within the document. Some 1,230 separate themes
were placed in main categories and carefully analyzed.
Fifty subject areas were categorized as the main themes
of the Goshkov statements. These categories are listed in
section VIII: Appendix A. When content analysis of all
113 documents was completed, a statistical analysis of the
fifty theme categories was undertaken.
Since the quantitive measuring device of this thesis
is thematic frequency, frequency of appearance figures were
calculated for each category. These figures were structured
two ways. First, the frequency of a theme over the entire
sample was calculated. Second, the frequency of appearance
of the main themes were calculated separately for the
Krushchev period, and then calculated again for the Brezhnev
era. Both periods equal approximately 9i years. This
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second breakdown was executed in order to analyze the
consistency of the Gorshkov code over time, and under two
distinct leaders.
The results of the frequency distribution calculations
follow: 1) the mean value of the frequency of appearance
of a given theme over the entire sample is 22.72%; 2) the
median value of the frequency of appearance of a given
theme over the entire sample is 16%; 3) the standard de-
viation about the mean for the entire sample is 18.31%.
From the figures listed above, and from an analysis
of Figure 2, the reader can determine that any theme with
a frequency of appearance greater than 22% is not only a
main theme to Admiral Gorshkov, but also an important one.
Examples are: Lenin's Industrial Program; Soviet Naval
Mission; and the Balanced Navy Concept. Any theme with a
frequency of appearance greater than k0% is of vital im-
portance to Admiral Gorshkov* s operational code. Examples
are: The Leadership of the CPSU; The Technological Re-
volution and its consequences; and The View of the Enemy.
Similarly, any theme with a frequency of appearance of kfo
or less is either a very new theme, or else a theme of
minor significance. Examples are: Proletarian Interna-
tionism, and Command and Control.
As was indicated above, the impact of time upon Ad-
miral Gorshkov* s operational code was analyzed by dividing
the sample data into two time periods. The first period







Theme Categories vs. Overall frequency (%)









Overal Frequencies of Individual Themes
ThemeA JL
1. =4-6% 11. = 7% 21. =30% 31. =27% 41. =12%
2. =32% 12. =11% 22. =41% 32. = 27% 42. =16%
3- =55% 13. =39% 23. =12% 33. =19% 43. = 8%
4. =20% 14. = 4% 24. =10% 34. =14% 44. =12%
5. =36% 15. =37% 25. =17% 35. =42% 45. = 8%
6. =25% 16. =15% 26. =27% 36. = 9% 46. =100%
7. =20% 17. =18% 27. =13% 37. =26% 47. =16%
8. =21% 18. = 66% 28. =12% 38. =12% 48. = 9%
9. =16% 19. = 23% 29. = 7% 39. =12% 49. =12%
10. =60% 20. =14-% 30. = 6% 4o. =11% 50. = 4%
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with Brezhnev's. The two periods extend from mid 1955 to
1965, and from I965 to mid 197^-, respectively. Thematic
frequency distributions were calculated for all fifty
main categories in each of the two periods. The results
of these calculations were compared category by category.
These comparisons were made in order to ascertain the net
increase or decrease in the frequency of appearance of a
particular theme across the two periods. The direction
of emphasis in any thematic change also was recorded. The
tabulated results of this process are displayed in Figure 3«
An analysis of Figure 3 indicates certain conclusions.
First, on balance, Admiral Gorshkov was and is a very con-
sistent individual. There were only four new theme
categories which appeared in the Brezhnev years that had
not been present under Krushchev: 1) Absence of Soviet
foreign bases and their geographic environment; 2) Ex-
ploitation of the world's oceans--the merchant marine, the
fishing fleet, and oceanographic research; 3) Soviet interest
in the Mediterranean; and 4) Command and control. " Vital
themes such as the importance of historical development, the
direction of the CPSU, the image of the opponent, and the
primacy of the submarine, indicated little if any change.
Four theme categories reflected 0% change between the two
periods: 1) New qualitative measures of a navy's effective-
ness; 2) the US has lost its naval supremacy; 3) The
importance of readiness, mobility, and vigilance; and 4)




Theme Categories and the Net % Change in Frequency of Ap-
pearance betv/een the Krushchev and Brezhnev Periods (50
Themes Tejsted) :
Theme # Krushchev Brezhnev % increase/decrease
1. *• 44% r46% +2%
2. « 24% 8 35% +11%
3.*' 62% >52% -10%
4. 27% 17% -10%
5- M# 50% ^30% -20%
6. 21% 26% +5%
7. 12% 24% +12%
8. 15% 24% +9%
9. 18% 15% -3%
10. v 52% -63% +11%




13. i 39% References to Krushchev
14. 3% 4% +1%
15.*' 32% i39% +7%
16. 15% 15% No change
17. 15% 19% +4%
18. •" ?o% 64% -6%
19- 18% 25% +7%
20. 15% 14% -1%
21. •' 32% ^30% -2%
22. " 23% ^48% +25%
23. 15% 11% -4%
24. 15% 8% -7%
25. 8 32% 10% -22%
26. 29% 27% -2%
27- 24% 8% -16%
28. 26% 6% -20%
29- 8% 6% -2%
30. 8% 5% -3%
31."" 8% <o4% +26%
32.^ 18% «>32% +14%
33. 8% 23% +15%
34. 6% 18% +12%
35. <-' 41% *42% +1%
36. 15% 6% -9%
37. 29% 24% -5%
38. 12% 12% No change
39. \Z% 12% No change
40. 3% 14% +11%
4l. 6% 15% +9%




Theme # Krushchev Brezhnev % increase/decrease
43. 3% 10fo +7%
hk. 6% 15% +9%
*5- None life New theme
k6. 100fo lOOfo No change
47. N/A 16% References to Brezhnev
k8. None 13% New theme
49. None I8f New theme
50. None 5% New theme
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Number of increases = +22
Number of decreases = -18
No change = ^
New themes = 4
Brezhnev & Krushchev = 2
Mean value of % change = 8?
Number of changes over 10%
Maximum change = 26%




a net change in frequency of appearance of over 18%. How-
ever, even these major shifts reflected a change in emphasis
rather than a radical departure from precedent.
The mean value for the percentage of net change of
all fifty theme categories was 8%. Twenty-two themes
indicated an increased emphasis during the Brezhnev era,
and eighteen themes registered a decreased emphasis from
the Krushchev period. Four new themes appeared under
Brezhnev, but no themes from the Krushchev period were dis-
counted completely. Appendix A. clearly illustrates all
this statistical information on an individual theme basis.
A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF MAIN THEME CATEGORIES
Theme #
1. The historical tradition of the Soviet Navy
2. Guarding the maritime borders of the USSR and the
labors of communism
3. The leadership of the CPSU
k. The special relationship of the KOMSOMOL and the
Soviet Navy
5. Cooperation of the Navy with other branches of the
Armed Forces
6. The Soviet Union is not only a great continental
land power, but also a great naval power
7. The Soviet Navy must defend Soviet interests at sea
8. The development of Soviet Naval Science
9. All Armed Forces and the entire populace must con-
tribute to ensure victory
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10. The technological revolution and its consequences
11. Reference to the Minister of Defense
12. The USSR cannot be a world power without a strong
Navy
13. Krushchev and his position as a patron of the Navy
Ik. Proletarian Internationalism
15. The importance of long cruises
16. Socialist Competition
17. Training must parallel combat conditions
18. View of the enemy
19. Lenin's industrial program
20. The ultimate triumph of communism
21. Soviet naval mission=defend the sea frontiers
(strategic defense) + destroy enemy naval forces
at sea (same) + strike blows against targets in
distant continents (strategic offense)
22. The international mission of the Soviet Navy
23. Importance of specialization and technical training
2k. One man command
25. Political growth and discipline in the military
26. The USSR pursues a program of peace
27. The danger of West German rearmament; Bonn
Revanchism
28. Massive retaliation if attacked—total nuclear war
29. Reaction to the US policy of encirclement




31. The importance of the Warsaw Pact
32. Lenin and his ideological influence as a special
Patron of the Navy
33- The Strategic Rocket Forces as the main deterrent
of imperialism
34. The necessity for balanced Armed Forces
35' The submarine is the basic unit of the Navy
36. US aircraft carriers and their obsolescence
37' The balanced navy concept
38. New qualitative measure of navy's effectiveness
39' The US has lost its naval supremacy
40. The "battle for the 1st salvo"
41. Importance of exercises
42. The basic unit of the navy is its cadre
43. The Soviet Union's difficult road to the sea
44. Limitations of major surface combatants
45. Absence of Soviet foreign bases and their geo-
graphic environment
46. The importance of readiness, mobility, and vigilance
47. Brezhnev
48. Exploitation of the world's oceans-- the merchant
marine, the fishing fleet, and oceanographic research
49. Soviet interest in the Mediterranean




The following predictions are based upon a systematic
analysis of Admiral Gorshkov's operational code, as well
as a projection of the fifty most significant naval themes
that the Admiral has advocated during his tour as Commander-
in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.
1. The international mission of the Soviet Navy will
expand greatly. Admiral Gorshkov's own words forecast
that "further growth in the power of our navy will be char-
acterized by an intensification of its international mission
(101:6^)." The "plenipotentiary role," the use of the Navy
as a "diplomatic tool," and as a "stabilizing influence"
in the international community are all important pluses
for Admiral Gorshkov's campaign to establish the Soviet
Navy as the Soviet Union's "most flexible instrument of
foreign policy." The significance of this theme has in-
creased 25% in recent years.
2. The "long cruise" and "out-of-area-operations" will
continue to increase in frequency. Admiral Gorshkov per-
ceives that "long cruises are schools in seamanship."
Gorshkov constantly asserts that the Soviet Navy will main-
tain a presence in "all the oceans of the world. " He has
cited with great pride the cruises of Soviet ships in the
Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean Sea, the Indian Ocean,
all areas of the Atlantic and Pacific including the coasts
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of China, Africa, and Latin America, plus the Artie and
Antarctic Oceans. This theme is consistent, but has in-
creased 7% in recent years.
3. As Soviet out-of-area-operations expand, so will
pressure to obtain overseas bases. Gorshkov has long envied
the US and British system of forward bases. But he is
caught in the dilemma of Soviet "non-interference" with
overseas countries. The Admiral tries to reduce the effect
of this dilemma by lobbying for "better seakeeping capa-
bilities," but the dilemma will become even more critical
with the forward deployment of the KIEV "large-ASW-ship.
"
Ultimately, the Soviets are going to have to obtain access
to forward bases for their Navy, Merchant Marine, Fishing
Fleet, and Ocean Research vessels. Their present propensity
toward at-sea anchorages will prove insufficient.
k. Training and large scale exercises will continue
to increase. Operations like "Sever," "OKEAN," and joint
WARSAW Pact exercises will expand. Gorshkov believes that
large scale training exercises most closely parallel com-
bat. The "rhythm" of planning and training is important
to fleet readiness (60sE3). The harsh conditions of train-
ing can reveal flaws in planning which then can be corrected
Gorshkov demands that training parallel the combat environ-
ment. The significance of this theme has increased in
recent years.
5. The WARSAW Pact will be strengthened and joint
operations among the navies of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria,
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Romania, East Germany, and Poland will be stressed and
encouraged (101:6^-). The WARSAW Pact will serve as a
vehicle to advance two important Soviet interests: 1) the
joint defense of the socialist community against the US
and NATO, and 2) a lever by which to implement the Brezhnev
Doctrine of Soviet supremacy within the socialist community.
The incidence of the WARSAW Pact theme has increased 26%
in recent years
.
6. Gorshkov's fear of West German rearmament is de-
clining and will continue to do so. Ostpolitik and Detente
have contributed to stabilize this area of Soviet paranoia.
From a theme of vital significance under Krushchev, the
fear of West German rearmament has decreased and has been
mentioned only once since 1969- The theme is still present,
but in much reduced emphasis.
7. The Soviet Union is going to push for a nuclear
free Mediterranean and, ultimately, a military-free Med-
iterranean. The Soviets have more to gain from the exclu-
sion of the US Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean than from
the expulsion of their Mediterranean Squadron. This ploy
might run counter to their "historic right to sail in the
Mediterranean," but would not disallow their penetration
of the area by other means: e.g. merchant ships, fishing
vessels, air assault in crisis, etc.. Geography plays a
major role in this prediction. This theme has appeared




8. Technology will continue to be stressed in the
Soviet Navy. Admiral Gorshkov is an inveterate innovator.
He is very receptive to new technologies related to elec-
tronics, electro-optics, satelite ocean surveillance
systems, laser weapons and communications, and computerized
automation. Quality, not quantity, will remain the corner-
stone of the Soviet Navy. Finally, the Admiral will ensure
that no "gaps" appear between technology, naval science,
and warfare tactics.
9. The tactics of the Soviet Navy will include sur-
prise attack. Admiral Gorshkov believes that "the first
salvo" is a necessary condition for victory at sea. The
Admiral has stressed the importance of command and control
to support such operations . The Admiral particularly em-
phasizes the modernization of submarine communications.
10. The Soviet Naval offensive strategic mission pri-
marily will emphasize land targets. The missile range of
the Delta class nuclear ballistic submarine corresponds
with the new emphasis in targeting stated by Gorshkov in
197^. "The chief (strategic) purpose of a navy is now
becoming action against land-based targets (113:A3)."
11. The submarine will remain the "basic unit of the
Soviet Navy." New ballistic missile submarines will be
designed to follow the Delta class SSBN. Gorshkov believes
that nuclear submarines are "the perfect ship; " "that arm
of the service which most fully incorporates the latest
achievements of scientific and technical progress (113 :A3)."
9^

Gorshkov states that SLBM's have better survivability than
land-launched ICBM's and, therefore , 'present a better
deterrent posture.
Gorshkov will modernize his submarine force with multi-
purpose missies (SSN-X-13's) and sublaunched cruise missiles
(SSN-X-15/16) . New Soviet SSGN's and SSN's will provide
front line strategic defense and sea denial against US air-
craft carriers and NATO task forces. New SSN's will execute
strategic defense against the threat of Polaris, Poseidan,
and Trident SSBN's.
Finally, the Admiral envisions an anti-ASW support
package for his own SSBN force. This support can best be
provided by the new KIEV class sea control ship.
12. Gorshkov implicity forecasts a sea control mission
for the new KIEV class ASW/VSTOL aircraft carrier. Admiral
Gorshkov defines sea control as "Achieving superiority of
forces over the enemy in the main sector and to pin him
down in the secondary sectors at the time of operations
in a theater or sector of a theater (9^*53) •" T° Gorshkov,
sea control is "a dynamic holding action," The sea control
ship that he will designate to perform this mission is the
KIEV "large-ASW-ship. " The KIEV will not function as an
attack carrier, but rather provide at-sea strategic defense
(with its VSTOL aircraft) ; submarine support and anti-ASW
protection for Soviet submarines; and serve as a "projector"
of Soviet sea presence in the international arena.
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13. Admiral Gorshkov does not predict a foreseeable
solution to the ASW problem. He will continue to develop
special mission surface ships and ASW patrol aircraft with
"cruise missile ASW weapons." The Admiral contends that
nuclear submarines "are also becoming valuable anti-
submarines, capable of detecting and destroying the enemy's
missile carrying submarines (99*62). " He perceives the
"cruise missile as the most effective ASW weapon (101:^-)."
But the Admiral sums up his position on ASW by comparing
the present situation to World War II. He wonders aloud
"since ASW forces which were so numerous and technically up
to date, possessing vast superiority, turned out to be capable
of only partially limiting the operations of diesel sub-
marines, then what must this superiority be today in order
to combat nuclear-powered submarines whose combat capa-
bilities are far superior (97*59)." In short, the Admiral
will continue to work on the ASW problem because it is so
serious, but for him the area remains an unsoluable threat.
1^. Soviet Naval Aviation is right behind submarines
in Admiral Gorshkov' s list of priorities. The new Backfire
supersonic bomber will be fitted with long range air-to-
surface cruise missiles in order to provide strategic
defense against US naval forces; whether those forces
be deployed at sea or remain at anchorage. The KIEV'S
new VSTOL aircraft will be equipped with both Harpoon type
anti-shipping missiles and ASW cruise missiles. New ASW
helicopters and long range patrol aircraft will be
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developed to extend further the perimeter of Soviet
strategic defense. In time of war, Admiral Gorshkov be-
lieves that Soviet Naval Aviation will be "the number one
defense force of Soviet sea lines of communication."
15- Soviet surface ships will be built with mission-
specific characteristics relating to strategic defense.
General purpose ships will not be built. Quality and tech-
nological advancement will override quantity considerations.
These surface ships (e.g. KARA , KRIVAK, KIEV , and their
follow-ons) will be employed to fulfill the Soviet's defini-
tion of "sea control:" not the US definition of sea denial!
The surface fleet will serve as a balance to the submarine
force and will provide protection for the Soviet SSBN's
and SSGN's. The Admiral always has supported a "balanced
force" and will continue to do so, but he also will continue
to give maximum priority to nuclear submarines.
16. The Soviet Union will expand its effort to inte-
grate its sea power forces. The Merchant Marine, Oceano-
graphic Research ships, and the Fishing Fleet will be able
to project Soviet influence where its Navy cannot. The
goals of the integration of Soviet sea power will be the
economic exploitation of the world's oceans and the political
penetration of the Third World. The Soviet Union will
strive to keep a low profile in this process and to scrup-
ulously obey international law. The Soviet Union will
pursue an "open oceans" policy (with notable exceptions)
,
lobby for a 12 mile international boundry limit, and press
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for the exclusion of military use of the seabed. The
integration of Soviet sea power is a new theme, but it
is receiving tremendous emphasis.
17. The Soviet Navy will not be used in direct support
of local wars which could involve direct confrontation
with the US. Gorshkov recognizes the danger of local
wars escalating into general war (99*63). The Soviet
leadership would have grave reservations about their ability
to "control" such a situation. The Soviet Navy will not
participate in overt military actions against the US Navy





This appendix is an itemized illustration of the thematic
analysis outlined in Section VI. A standard format is em-
ployed in the presentation of each of the fifty theme
categories presented. This format is explained below:
Theme #
.
(The theme number is an arbitrary numerical as-
signment stemming from the chronology of the theme cate-
gory's first appearance. These numbers do not reflect
ranking, and are used for organizational purposes only.)
Main theme category: (This phrase or title indicates the
most encompas singly descriptive symbol of Gorshkov's
public comments relating to a specific area of interest.
)
Related themes: (Related themes represent a family of
similar perceptions which are closely aligned with the
central intent of the main theme category.)
First Appearance: (The date of the first significant
appearance of the theme category.)
Last Appearance: (The date of the last significant
appearance of the theme category.)
Statistics
:




Overall frequency: (The number of appearances of a
theme category recorded by document count/divided by the
entire sample size: 113 documents.)
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Krushchev; (The number of appearances of a theme cate-
gory during the Krushchev era/the number of opportunities
for the appearance of a theme in the Krushchev era: 3^-
documents.
)
Brezhnev; (The number of appearances of a theme cate-
gory during the Brezhnev era/the number of opportunities
for the appearance of a theme in the Brezhnev era: 79
documents
.
% increase/decrease: (This figure will reflect the net
difference between the frequency of appearance of a theme
category in the Krushchev period from that of the Brezhnev
period. The direction of that net change also is noted.)
Comments
:
(General background information or interesting
supportive facts concerning a specific theme category.
)
Representative quotations: (Document #: page #.)
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The historical tradition of the Soviet Navy
2. Guarding the maritime borders of the USSR and the labors
of communism
3. The leadership of the CPSU
k. The special relationship of the KOMSOMOL and the Soviet
Navy
5. Cooperation of the Navy with other branches of the
Armed Forces
6. The Soviet Union is not only a great continental land
power, but also a great naval power
7. The Soviet Navy must defend Soviet interests at sea
8. The development of Soviet Naval Science
9. All Armed Forces and the entire populace, must con-
tribute to ensure victory
10. The technological revolution and its consequences
11. Reference to the Minister of Defense
12. The USSR cannot be a world pov/er without a strong Navy
13« Krushchev and his position as a patron of the Navy
Ik. Proletarian Internationalism
15- The importance of long cruises
16. Socialist Competition
17. Training must parallel combat conditions
18. View of the enemy
19. Lenin's industrial program
20. The ultimate triumph of communism
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21. Soviet naval mission= defend the sea frontiers
(strategic defense) + destroy enemy naval forces at sea
(same) + strike "blows against targets in distant con-
tinents (strategic offense)
22. The international mission of the Soviet Navy
23. Importance of specialization and technical training
24. One man command
25 • Political growth and discipline in the military
26. The USSR pursues a program of peace
27. The danger of West German rearmament; Bonn Revanchism
28. Massive retaliation if attacked— total nuclear v/ar
29. Reaction to the US policy of encirclement
30. The preeminent position of the USSR within the socialist
community
31. The importance of the Warsaw Pact
32. Lenin and his ideological influence as a special
Patron of the Navy
33 • The Strategic Rocket Forces as the main deterrent
of imperialism
34. The necessity for balanced Armed Forces
35* The submarine is the basic unit of the Navy
36. US aircraft carriers and their obsolescence
3?. The balanced navy concept
38. New qualitative measure of a navy's effectiveness
39 • The US has lost its naval supremacy
40. The "battle for the 1st salvo"
41. Importance of exercises
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k2. The basic unit of the navy is its cadre
^3« The Soviet Union's difficult road to the sea
kk. Limitations of major surface combatants
k$. Absence of Soviet foreign bases and their geographic
environment
hd. The importance of readiness, mobility, and vigilance
k7 . Brezhnev
^-8. Exploitation of the world's oceans--the merchant marine,
the fishing fleet, and oceanographic research
^•9' Soviet interest in the Mediterranean




Main theme category: The historical' tradition of the Soviet
Navy
Related themes: the Russian history of sea power and ex-
ploration, the Soviet naval tradition from the October
Revolution and the Great Patriotic War, the importance of
tradition in propaganda for new cadres
First Appearance: July 27, 1955







Comments: This consistent theme is vital to Admiral Gorsh-
kov's "belief system, and reflects the intense historical
prospective with which he views the rise of Soviet sea
power.





Main theme category: Guarding the maritime borders of
the USSR and the labors of communism
Related themes: Frontline sea defense of the entire social-
ist community
First Appearance: July Zk , 1955







Comments: This theme is the forerunner of the strategic
defense mission of the Soviet Navy. The theme has been
important in the past, but has received particular emphasis
in recent years. Strategic defense has been a vital theme
since 1968.





Main theme category: The leadership of the CPSU
Related themes s leadership of the Central Committee of the
CPSU, the role of the CPSU in determining the "correct path"
for the Party and the Navy, the importance of the various
Congresses of the CPSU, the patronage and leadership of the
Party with respect to the Navy
First Appearance: July 27 1 1955







Comments: Gorshkov has always legitimatized his putlic state-
ments with reference to the CPSU. He perceives the CC of the
CPSU as the center of decision-making for Soviet policy.
However, after Gorshkov solidified his own political base
during the Krushchev period, he has placed less emphasis on
the benediction of the Party for all his public statements.
But overall, Gorshkov recognizes the importance and the
primacy of the Party in all significant policy matters.
Therefore, the leadership of the CPSU is still a vital theme
in all of Gorshkov' s major addresses.





Main theme category: The special relationship of the
KOMSOMOL and the Soviet Navy
Related themes: the training that the KOMSOMOL provides
Soviet seamen
First Appearance: July 27, 1955







Comments: Gorshkov often alludes to the patronage of the
KOMSOMOL by the Navy, and he takes great pride that 90$
of all sailors are either KOMSOMOL members or communists.
This theme has decreased in recent years as Gorshkov has
found less reason to politically justify his every move.





Main theme category: Cooperation of the Navy with other
branches of the Armed Forces
Related themes: "the faithful helper of the Army," the
need for joint operations to ensure victory
First Appearance: July 2^, 1955







Comments: Gorshkov used this theme as a political balance
to his goal of increasing Soviet Naval prestige. This
theme was vital under Krushchev, but is less important in
recent years. Gorshkov most often uses this theme now when
comparing the merits of the SRT and the Navy. He does
believe that joint operations are critical in war, and this
belief is readily apparent when his speaks of amphibious
operations. Overall, this theme is a political tool which
Gorshkov employs in order to broaden his political support
among the other branches of the Armed Forces.




Main theme category: The Soviet Union is not only a great
continental land power, but also a great naval power
Related themes: the Soviet Navy is a true ocean-going fleet
First Appearance: July Zk, 1955







Comments: In the early years, Gorshkov knew that the sub-
stance of this theme was hollow. But by 1963> the Admiral
began to boast of the power of the Soviet Navy; particularly
in reference to "long cruises" in all the oceans of the
world. In recent years, Gorshkov has emphasized this
theme, but always in the context of the "peaceful purposes"
of the Soviet Navy. Soviet Naval "power" does not wash
well with the Third World countries, and Gorshkov recog-
nizes this nuance. On balance, the naval power of the
Soviet Navy, in one form or another, is still a major theme
in Gorshkov' s public addresses.




Main theme category: The Soviet Navy must defend Soviet
interests at sea
Related themes: "all the socialist country's interests,"
and "in all the world's oceans" were added in recent years
to the main theme
First Appearance: July 2k, 1955







Comments: Soviet "interests at sea" is the operative phrase
in this theme. But neither the USSR nor Admiral Gorshkov
has defined clearly what these interests are. In any event,
Soviet interest is a dynamic quality and varies with cor-
responding "opportunities." Soviet economic interests at
sea are on the increase as indicated "by the expansion of
their merchant fleet and fishing industry. Another factor
which affects the emphasis of this theme is Soviet per-
ception of the Brezhnev doctrine and its linkage to the
international mission of communism. In sum, the theme of
Soviet "interests at sea" has risen from minor importance
during the Krushchev era to major and increasing signifi-
cance in contemporary times.




Main theme category: The development of Soviet Naval Science
Related themes: tactics, "small war theory," Lenin's eight
principles of strategy, the definition of sea control, the
revolution of technology and nuclear weapons with respect to
tactics, operational science
First Appearance: July 2k, 1955







Comments: This is the single most important theme of this
entire analysis : not "because of the priority which Gorshkov
assigns it (only mid-range), but because this is the single
best indicator of the ways in which the Admiral views modern
war at sea. He speaks of small war theory, the theories of
A.T, Mahan, the use of operations research and computers
in the Navy, the importance of aviation and submarines, the
problems of ASW, his concept of control of the sea and
nuclear war, the new tactics that were developed as a result
of nuclear weapons , the place of the aircraft carrier in
modern war, the importance of local wars and the chances of
Soviet participation in them, and numerous other topics.
This theme is consistent throughout all Admiral Gorshkov 1 s
writings and has been on the increase in recent years.
Ill

Representative quotations: (*H: throughout); (93




Main theme category: All Armed Forces and the entire
populace must contribute to ensure victory
Related themes: war is linked to the people, the Armed
Forces is linked to the people
First Appearance: July 2k, 1955







Comments: Gorshkov develops this theme to paraphrase the
doctrines of Marx and Lenin. He uses the Soviet victory
in World War II as a prime example of this theme . He also
uses this theme to indicate the "integrated" character
of the Soviet Armed Forces: they are a "composite of all
the nationalities .
"





Main theme category: The technological revolution and its
consequences
Related themes: qualitative technical changes, the advent
of rockets and nuclear weapons, the revolution of technical
ocean exploitation
First Appearance: July 28, 1955







Comments: This theme category is the second most important
of all Gorshkov's public themes. Gorshkov perceives his
Navy as a product of the technical revolution. Technology
and scientific advancement are intermixed in a vast majority
of all his statements. He glorifies in "Sputnik," the
atomic submarine, the science of naval operations, and in
the technical revolution itself.
Representative quotations: (20:1); (24:18); (27:cc3);




Main theme category: Reference to the Minister of Defense
Related themes : None
First Appearance: July 28, 1956--Malinovskiy, December 1967--
Grechko









Comments: This theme is important because the Minister of
Defense is Admiral Gorshkov* s direct superior in the Ministry
of Defense. In the early years, Gorshkov often referenced
remarks of Minister Malinovskiy. But in recent years,
as Gorshkov has solidified his political position, the
Admiral has been less verbose in his recognition of the
Minister of Defense. The major exception to the decline of
this theme was the reference to and quotations of Marshall
Grechko in the "Navies in War and Peace" series. Also in
197^ f Admiral Gorshkov has made several references to his
own position within the Ministry of Defense. He has spoken
of the Armed Forces generally, and not limited his remarks
to the navy exclusively. However, this theme has not been
a major objective in Admiral Gorshkov's speeches over the
years
.




Main theme category: The USSR cannot be a world power
without a strong Navy
Related themes: the historic importance of navies as a
tool of major powers
First Appearance: February 20, 1958







Comments: Gorshkov first used this theme under Krushchev
as a tool for developing his navy. Under Brezhnev the power
of the Soviet Navy had become a reality. Gorshkov quotes
historic examples of the importance of a strong navy for
both peace and wartime uses. He contends that the ocean
will be the decisive battle-ground in modern warfare. He
cites Peter the Great's famous quotation: "Every potentate
who has only ground forces has only one hand; yet whoever
has a navy too, has both hands." This theme has increased
to a marked degree in recent years.





Main theme category: Krushchev and his position as a patron
of the Navy
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 20, 1958







Comments: Admiral Gorshkov's references to Krushchev present
an interesting irony. The Admiral used the Krushchev im-
permator even though Krushchev was one of the foremost
critiques of Gorshkov's balanced fleet concept. Krushchev
would have pared the Soviet Navy to submarines only; yet
Gorshkov needed Krushchev's political support in order to
increase the support of the Navy. On balance, the Krushchev
theme was critical to the Admiral's objectives in the early
I960' s. By 196^-, Admiral Gorshkov had been able to acquire
Krushchev's implicit recognition of the need for a diverse,
well-integrated naval force. If one compares the frequency
of the Krushchev theme to that of the Brezhnev theme, it
becomes apparent that Krushchev's political support was more
important to Admiral Gorshkov than Brezhnev's backing is now.





Main theme category: Proletatian Internationalism
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 20, 1958







Comments: Gorshkov utilizes this theme in "building the
ideological content of his public statements. He contends
that this theme is one of the basic factors behind the
Soviet Union's rationale for the international mission for
her navy. He uses this theme to cement the common interests
of the Soviet Union with those of the Warsaw Pact. However,
this theme has been of minor consequences by itself and
usually is combined with other communist philosophic beliefs
to form an ideological base for Gorshkov' s programs.





Main theme category: The importance of long cruises
Related themes: Training during long voyages, the importance
of seakeeping-capabilities
First Appearance: February 20, 1958







Comments: This theme is one of Gorshkov's central naval
postulates. The Admiral has pushed long cruises as "the
main school of seamanship" under both Krushchev and Brezhnev.
He takes great pride in Soviet out-of-area operations, and
he contends that this part of Soviet operations will in-
crease in the future. The Admiral believes that "Each of
the thousands of miles traveled by (Soviet) ships was ably
used for combat training-" He contends that long cruises
will reveal flaws in naval tactics which then can be
corrected quickly and effectively. "Long cruises" has al-
ways been a major theme in Gorshkov's addresses and has
received even more emphasis since 19&3.





Main theme category: Socialist Competition
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 20, 1958






% increase/decrease: No change
Comments: This is another ideological term like proletarian
internationalism that Gorshkov employs to validate his
public statements. This theme is often used in response to
CPSU Congress programs which require sacrifices and support
by the Navy. The North Sea sailors use the motto: "Know
and Maintain Weapons and Combat Equipment Well, and Master
Them Skillfully." The socialist competition theme is used
to exhort the Navy to greater heights of professionalism and
political zeal. This phase seems to be a favorite of
Gorshkov' s, and he has used it consistently throughout his
tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
Representative quotations: (4-3:20); (62:E9); (67:E3);




Main theme category: Training must parallel combat
conditions
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 20, 1958







Comments: This theme category is closely allied with
Gorshkov's belief in the importance of long cruises, train-
ing in specialized areas, and political indoctrination. He
contends that each of these approaches will increase disci-
pline and combat readiness. The Admiral believes that
training under harsh sea conditions will reveal errors in
naval tactics. He perceives benefit in operating in the
difficult environment of "the Arctic, the oppressive heat
of equitorical regions, and under the stress of long periods
at sea." The Admiral believes that training must be
"rhythmic" and in phase with planning. He sees this
planning-training cyclic process as a close peacetime model
of real combat operations. He visualizes each commanding
officer as personally responsible for ensuring that all
training parallel combat conditions. This theme has been
consistent in both the Krushchev and Brezhnev eras.
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Main theme- category: View of the enemy
Related themes: Perception of the US, of NATO, of imperialism,
of capitalism, of the US Navy, of West German Revanchism
First Appearance: February 20, 1958






Comments: This is the second most pronounced theme in
Gorshkov's public statements. He consistently views the US
and its navy as the prime sources of conflict in the inter-
national arena. He perceives the US as the foremost imperial-
ist power and its navy as a "policeman's stick" for executing
its ill will. He decries US intervention in Asia, Southeast
Asia, Latin America, and Europe. He views NATO as a direct
threat to peace in Europe. He would free the sea-bed and
the Mediterranean from all military uses. And the Admiral
warns of US plans for massive ocean exploitation. In sum,
the Admiral believes the political universe to exist in a
state of intense conflict, and the US is the primary source
of that conflict. In recent years, the Admiral has per-
ceptibly moderated his rhetoric, but his basic belief of
hostility toward the US and its allies is still present.
Representative quotations: (^3*19); (^9*9-11); (75s 2^);





Main theme category: Lenin's industrial program
Related themes: Economy+industry+science^material base=
naval base, the "navy is the most graphic indicator of
industrial progress," Armed Forces are dependent on the
economy of the state
First Appearance: February 20, 1958






Comments: Gorshkov uses this theme as the basis for Soviet
naval development. All Soviet industrial progress is based
upon Lenin's model. Once a state's economy has been de-
veloped, its technology and science advanced, and its material
base assured, then that state can begin to consider a strong
military force. Gorshkov believes that the most graphic
indicator of a state's industrial progress is its navy. All
great world powers have possessed large navies. Gorshkov
contends that the CPSU carefully monitors the Soviet material
base through the use of Lenin's industrial program. Only
the Party can make all the correct decisions to ensure the
effective execution of Lenin's program. As the technology
of the Soviet navy has advanced in recent years, Gorshkov
has become more reliant on this theme as the developmental
"process" of the Soviet Navy.
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Representative quotations: (6:1); (2^:6 & 18); (26:CC2);




Main theme category: The ultimate triumph of communism
Related Themes: The invincible form of the Soviet state
and the Soviet social order, the invincible nature of the
Soviet Armed Forces
First Appearance: May 9» 1958






Comments: Admiral Gorshkov is confident of the ultimate
triumph of communism and the invincible status of the Soviet
Armed Forces. He contends that World War II changed the
balance of the international system in favor of communism.
He believes that World War II and the Soviet Union provided
the opportunity for third world countries to throw off the
yoke of colonial imperialism and to pursue socialism through
"just wars of liberation." The Admiral believes that com-
munism will triumph in the end, but as long as capitalism
is allowed to exist, the seeds of conflict will still be
present. This theme has been consistent throughout the
19 years of public statements analyzed.





Main theme category: Soviet naval mi'ssion=defend the sea
frontiers (strategic defense) + destroy enemy naval forces
at sea (same) + strike blows against targets in distant
continents (strategic offense)
Related themes: Naval mission in nuclear war, naval mission
in local wars, wartime mission in general
First Appearance: July 27, 1958






Comments: The mission of the Soviet navy has moved from
strategic defense in the early Gorshkov years, to strategic
offense against land targets in recent years. The broad
definition of the Soviet wartime mission has not changed,
but the capability of the Soviet navy to perform its tasks
has increased greatly. In early years, Gorshkov talked
about "blunting the aggressor's blow." He worried about
extending the defense perimeter to sea in order to counter
the US aircraft carriers and Polaris submarines. Now he
believes that the chief purpose of his navy is to strike
land targets in distant continents. He contends that he
can now "execute any mission on the world's oceans" which
he is ordered to do. He believes that his nuclear
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ballistic submarines have better survivability than land
based ICBM' s and hence are a better deterrent. Gorshkov's
perception of the Soviet Naval mission has not changed,
but his tools have
.





Main theme- category: The international mission of the
Soviet Navy-
Related themes: The diplomatic uses of a navy, its pleni-
potentiary role, gunboat diplomacy, stabilizing influence
in the international arena, symbol of mutual understanding, etc.
First Appearance: February 23 » 1959






Comments: The international mission of the Soviet Navy
is the important theme of Gorshkov' s public statements in
recent years. This theme has increased 25% in frequency
during the last 9 years. Gorshkov forecasts "that any
increase in Soviet naval power in future years will be re-
lated to its international mission. Gorshkov is fond of
pointing to the fact that navies can achieve political
objectives without resorting to confrontation or military
operations. He cites historical examples of periods when
Russia lost the diplomatic initiative because she had a
weak navy. He points to the fact that a strong Soviet
Navy will have a stabilizing influence in peacetime, and
such a navy would increase international understanding and
good will. Gorshkov perceives the Soviet Navy as the
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most flexible arm of Soviet foreign policy. The importance
of this theme cannot be overs tressed.
'
Representative quotations: (33:CC3); (63:E5); (65: E6);
(71:E^); (7^:E3-^); (89:21-22); (91i53-*)l (98:59);




Main theme category: Importance of specialization and
technical training
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 23. 1959






Comments: This theme is tied in with the technical revolu-
tion which so greatly affected naval development. The
Admiral believes that the only solution to keeping abreast
of technology is massive training in specialized areas.
He is proud of the fact that over 90fo of his sailors are
trained specialists. This theme has been consistent over
the years and indicates Gorshkov's intense interest in
modernization and maximumized utilization of all personnel.





Main theme category: One man command
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 23 • 1959







Comments: Admiral Gorshkov noted the importance of one-man
control in an article in 1963- He devoted an entire article
to, this concept in late 1973 entitled "Ship's Commanding
Officer." Gorshkov is a firm believer in leadership-by-
one-person as opposed to the earlier "dual command" system
under which orders of the CO. required the counter-signature
of the deputy commander for political matters . Gorshkov
believes that one man control clearly defines responsibility.
Representative quotations: (9:CC10-12); (2^: 25);





Main theme category: Political growth and discipline
in the military
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 23, 1959






Comments : This theme was very prevalent during the Krushchev
era, but has been reduced in recent years. Gorshkov used
to contend that the strength of a military unit was its
political organization. He believed that discipline could
be achieved through political indoctrination. He still
holds this same belief, but it has been greatly reduced in
recent years. Now he stresses training and specialization
to achieve the same ends.





Main theme category; The USSR pursues a program of peace
Related themes: Peaceful coexistence, Detente, SALT, ne-
gotiations, Law of the Sea conferences, Test Ban Treaty,
peace missions, compliance with international law
First Appearance: July 26, 1959






Comments: This is a major theme in all Gorshkov's statements
He contends that nuclear war is not inevitable, and that as
Soviet might increases, the likelihood of war decreases. He
believes that "the new stage of communism" requires peace
and that peaceful coexistence and detente are the ways to
obtain it. He backs SALT, negotiations for the control of
the sea bed, and international boundary limits. He stresses
the peaceful mission of the Soviet Navy and its careful com-
pliance with international law. He states that the Soviet
Navy is an instrument of stabilization in the international
arena. In sum, the Admiral believes in a policy of peace
to reduce international tension, but that that policy must
by backed by strength.
Representative quotations: (30:CC2); (4-2:^); (4-6:1);





Main theme category: The danger of West German rearmament;
Bonn Revanchism
Related themes: None
First Appearance: July 26, 1959






Comments: This was a major theme under Krushchev. The
Russian fear of German rearmament was very pronounced until
their initiation of Ost Politik. Gorshkov was very fearful
that the US would give Bonn nuclear weapons . He made a
major speech in 196^ attacking the idea of multinational,
"chameleon-warships" armed with nuclear weapons. He saw
the US plan of multinational NATO ships as a ploy to rearm
West Germany with nuclear weapons. He called this program
"a return to the policy of Dulles of balancing on the brink
of war." This theme appeared as a major objective in
Gorshkov* s speeches twelve times from July 196^ to May 1969
(31$) • This theme has only been mentioned once since May
1969* The theme was present once in the "Navies in War
and Peace" series, but has been all but dismissed recently.





Main theme category: Massive retaliation if attacked--
total nuclear war
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 2, 1962







Comments: The policy of massive retaliation was prevalent
under Krushchev. In recent years, it has been replaced
with more subtle deterrent methodologies. Gorshkov first
talked about massive retaliation in connection with the
"Caribbean Crisis." In 1963. he spoke of the USSR's unified
strategy on nuclear weapons use. By 196^, he stated that
all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces possessed nuclear
weapons. But by 1969 » ^s rhetoric concerning nuclear
war began to cool. He still exclaimed the power of his
ballistic missile submarines and his cruise missile armed
Soviet Naval Aviation, but he spoke more in technical terms
than in threatening terms. Gorshkov has no questions con-
cerning massive Soviet response to US aggression, but
this theme has mellowed in recent years.
Representative quotations: (15:1); (16:1) (19:28); (21:15);




Main theme category: Reaction to the US policy of encircle-
ment
Related themes: "The ring of fire"
First Appearance: February 2, 1962







Comments: Gorshkov has always worried about the NATO en-
circlement of the socialist block. This is one of the
primary reasons why he calls for a nuclear free Mediterranean,
He contends that the best way to break this "ring of fire"
is to extend the Soviet defense perimeter farther to sea.
The Admiral believes that cooperation with Warsaw Pact
navies will also tend to reduce the effectiveness of the
US encirclement. In any event, this theme is a minor one
in Gorshkov' s total public sample, but it does combine
issues of many of his major themes, (e.g. cooperation,
strategic defense, etc.)




Main theme category: The preeminent position of the USSR
within the socialist community
Related themes: Brezhnev Doctrine
First Appearance: February 23 i i960







Comments: Gorshkov has used this theme to indicate the
position of responsibility that the USSR possesses within
the socialist community. He has been careful not to use
this theme as a threat against other Warsaw Pact countries.,
but rather as an ideological truism. Gorshkov believes
that it is the responsibility of the Soviet Union to ensure
the ideological purity of the socialist system. In 1971
»
he paraphrased the Brezhnev Doctrine in calling the Soviet
Union the first socialist state in the world. He quotes
Lenin in claiming that the preeminence of the Soviet Union
must be recognized. He claims that the aggressive policies
of the People's Republic of China are anti-socialist. In
terms of ideological significance, this theme is important
indeed.





Main theme category: The importance of the Warsaw Pact
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 23 » i960







Comments: This theme has received tremendous emphasis since
1964. Gorshkov believes in the importance of combined/joint
exercises with the Warsaw Pact navies. This ploy not only
solidifies the bond between the Soviet Union and its allies,
but also extends the defense perimeter of the USSR seaward.
Gorshkov perceives the Warsaw Pact as the best answer to
NATO. Gorshkov believes that its members have a common
ideology, the same purposes and problems, a belief in ex-
panding internationalism, and respect for each other's
national culture and traditions. He views the Warsaw Pact
as a defensive alliance against the corruption of capitalism.
This "corrupting influence" is the rationale for the Brezhnev
Doctrine. In sum, the Warsaw Pact theme has been vital in
Gorshkov statements in recent years. Gorshkov continues
to emphasize this theme with an increasing number of joint
Soviet-East European naval exercises.





Main theme category: Lenin and his ideological influence
as a special Patron of the Navy.
Related Themes: The Navy as the vanguard of the revolution,
Lenin's Principles of Strategy, Naval science and Dialectical
Materialism
First Appearance: February 20, 1958







Comments: Gorshkov has taken great care to develop this
theme in recent years. He has tried to document the prestige
of the Navy "based on Lenin's words and strategies. He quotes
Lenin as saying "The Navy is the basic unit of the Armed
Forces" and "The Navy is the vanguard of the revolution."
Gorshkov quotes Lenin in order to justify an aggressive
foreign policy based on military power in general and naval
power in particular. He seems to use "The Leninist Princi-
ples of Military Science" to offset the political tactic of
Detente. Lenin's strategies tend to strengthen his militant
position. A hard line military position would be weakened'
if Detente were followed to its ultimate conclusion. In any
event, Gorshkov has taken Lenin as his "patron saint" in
recent years. He devotes an entire section of article
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# 6/72 of "Navies in War and Peace" to discussing Lenin
and his ideological influence on the 'military science.





Main theme category: The Strategic Rocket Forces as the
main deterrent of imperialism
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 23 i I960







Comments: The SRT was not formed until i960, so this theme
did not appear before that date. Gorshkov contends that
although the SRT was the main deterrent of the USSR, now
the Soviet Navy ranks with coequal status. He cites the
high survivability figure of ballistic submarines over land
based ICBMs . Gorshkov argues that land nuclear missile can
not do it all. He contends that these forces must be
augmented by nuclear submarines and missile armed aircraft.
He implicitly advocates the same triad concept that the US
possesses. In any event, Gorshkov recognizes the importance
of the SRT as a major strategic deterrent. He desires
part of that same mission for his Navy.
Representative quotations: (50:1); (59:E5); (65:E5);




Main theme category: The necessity for balanced Armed Forces
Related themes: Joint/Combined operations
First Appearance: February 23 • i960







Comments: Gorshkov is a great adherent of balanced, co-
operative armed forces. He cites the problems of World
War II concerning amphibious operations as an example of
the lack of balance. Another example during World War II
was the lack of adequate air support for the naval forces.
Gorshkov quotes Lenin in saying that victory can only be
determined by a total effort of all the elements of the
armed forces and the people. This theme has increased in
significance in recent years as Gorshkov has lobbied for
a "balanced navy." He uses many of the same arguments
for a balanced navy as he does for a balanced armed forces.





Main theme category: The submarine is the basic unit of
the Navy
Related themes: The decline in the value of surface ships
First Appearance: February 23, I960







Comments: The submarine is the core of Admiral Gorshkov's
Navy. He views the submarine as "a modern undersea
cruiser," "the perfect ship," "and the highest form of
technical advancement." He claims that nuclear ballistic
submarines are the best and most effective deterrent against
imperialist aggression. He states that submarines can
completely strangle a state by cutting its lines of com-
munication through barrier operations . He views the sub-
marine as the number one ASW platform (and the only really
effective one). He envisions a tremendous support package
to add to submarine effectiveness. The Admiral believes
that sea control can be obtained by Soviet submarines
properly supported. He states that submarines have re-
volutionized naval science and warfare. In short, the
submarine is the basis of Admiral Gorshkov's Navy. All
else is collateral or supportive in the eyes of the Admiral.
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Representative quotations: (14:1); (15:1); (16:1);
(17:1-2);. (24*19-20); (30iCCl-2)| (41:16-1?); (50:1);




Main theme category: US aircraft carriers and their
obsolescence
Related themes: Carriers cannot compare with nuclear
submarines
First Appearance: July 31, i960







Comments: Gorshkov has always recognized the effectiveness
of US carriers in a limited war situation. He has tried to
diminish their threat potential in a nuclear war, but none-
theless has taken strong measures to combat them. The
important thing to note about Gorshkov' s statements on
aircraft carriers in recent years is what he has not said.
He had de-emphasized this theme markedly since 1969- In
1967, Gorshkov was emphatic about the high vulnerability
of aircraft carriers. But he was referring strictly to
strike carriers—not sea control ships. In recent years,
the Admiral has stressed the importance of naval aviation
and its role as the number one defender of Soviet sea lines
of communication in any future conflict. Gorshkov sees
a very real place in his navy for a sea control type ship.
The Moskva was the first cut, the Keiv the second, and
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there will be future refinements. The Admiral has argued
against carriers in the past, but he has modified his
position and will continue to move toward a sea control
concept to guard Soviet interests at sea, to support
Soviet submarine operations, and to project Soviet sea
power overseas
.





Main theme category: The balanced navy concept
Related themes: submarines cannot do it all
First Appearance: October 31, 1962







Comments: Admiral Gorshkov is an advocate of not only a
balanced navy, but an integrated one as well. The Admiral
believes that there must be even development among the
submarine, naval aviation, surface, and amphibious forces
in order to maximize the effectiveness of each. Further,
he contends that the Navy must be balanced with the mer-
chant marine, the fishing fleet, and the Soviet oceanographic
program. Gorshkov does state that certain forces within
this complex should receive emphasis (e.g. submarines and
naval aviation) , but this emphasis should never be extended
to the point of exclusion of any one sector. The Admiral
does not specify in detail which forces should dominate,
but rather that the entire naval complex should be balanced
in order to perform any mission which the Party leadership
assigns it. This balanced force will not be composed of
general purpose ships, but rather mission specific ships
which will readily integrate to accomplish the mission at
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hand. This theme is a major naval theme to Admiral
Gorshkov.
Representative quotations: (^1:19—definition); (75*22-




Main theme category! New qualitative measure of a
navy's effectiveness
Related themes: None
First Appearance: July 29. 1962







Comments: Admiral Gorshkov believes that the technical
revolution has caused the necessity of a new measurement
of naval effectiveness. The Mahan theory of sea power is
no longer the complete answer because it does not consider
qualitative improvements in naval hardware. Quality, not
quantity, is not the main indicator of naval power. Admiral
Gorshkov states that all Soviet naval advancement is based
upon qualitative advances and, because of this fact, the
Soviet navy has been able to close the "gap" between
itself and the US navy.





Main theme category: The US has lost its naval supremacy
Related themes: None
First Appearance: May JO, 1963







Comments: Admiral Gorshkov has great respect for US
seapower. When he first claimed that the US was not
supreme at sea in I963 his remarks were hollow: they are
no longer. The Admiral claims that the Soviet Navy can
perform its missions in its own areas of interest. He has
never claimed a sea control mission for his navy; at least
not in the same terms that the US Navy employs. Admiral
Gorshkov states that the Soviet Navy has reached coequal
status with the US Navy. He does not claim superiority
to the US Navy in all areas . But the Admiral is now
confident that his navy could hold its own in either a
conventional or nuclear confrontation with the US Navy.
He now has the hardware to back up such an assertion.






Main theme category: The "battle for the 1st salvo"
Related themes: Surprise attack
First Appearance: May 30, 19&3







Comments : Admiral Gorshkov is an advocate of the initia-
tive . He claims that the first moments in a modern battle
at sea will go a long way to determining the final out-
come of the conflict. He quotes Lenin concerning the
importance of surprise. To Admiral Gorshkov, the battle
for the first salvo is a necessary condition for ultimate
victory.





Main theme category: Importance of exercises
Related themes: Joint operations, realistic combat training
First Appearance: June 2^, 1963







Comments: This theme has received increased emphasis in
recent years. The Admiral points with pride to such
operations as "Sever" and "Okean." He also states that
World War II indicated the importance of large scale,
joint exercises. Admiral Gorshkov believes that large
scale exercises are an excellent way of modelling real
combat conditions. He stresses the necessity of including
the Warsaw Pact navies in such exercises. In sum, this
theme has increased in recent years, and is likely to
continue to do so
.
Representative quotations: (55:1); (56:1-2); (67:E1);





Main theme category: The basic unit of the navy is its
cadre
Related themes : Cadre training
First Appearance: July 19&3







Comments : Admiral Gorshkov pays great tribute to the
quality of Soviet sailors. He refers to them as his
"gold fund." The Admiral makes reference to the recruiting
and military draft problems encountered in the Soviet
Union. He speaks of the racial integration of the Navy;
combining elements of all the nationalities of the USSR.
The Admiral takes great pride in the achievements of his
sailors once they have returned to civilian life. He
believes that the Navy has a special responsibility to
train its cadre in ideology and technical skills. This
theme has increased to a significant degree in recent
years. The Admiral seems to be using this theme to "sell"
the navy life to the Soviet citizenry.
Representative quotations: (2^:13-1*0; (35:CC7); (60:E3);





Main theme category: The Soviet Union's difficult road
to the sea
Related themes: Leadership problems, geographical constraints
First Appearance: July 1963







Comments: Admiral Gorshkov points to the historic search
for warm water ports by the USSR. He cites the historic
destiny of Soviet access to the Mediterranean. He decries
the misuse of the navy by the Tsar, by Soviet leaders during
the 1930's (does not mention Stalin!), and by tacticians
during the early 50's. The Admiral condemns false western
propaganda which stated that Russia was a land power only.
He admits the severe geographic constraints of maintaining
separate fleets in the Baltic, the North Sea, the Mediter-
ranean (Black) Sea, and the Pacific. But after all these
problems, Gorshkov exclaims that the Soviet Navy has con-
quered them all and now is a first class ocean-going force.
He has ample reason for such optimism.
Representative quotations: (24: throughout); (4l: through-




Main theme category: Limitations of major surface combatants
Related themes : Their replacement by submarines
First Appearance: July I963







Comments: Gorshkov does not so much argue against surface
ships (for he has a very real need of them) as he points
out their shortcomings. The Admiral points to the fact
that surface ships were only effective in World War II
when they possessed sufficient air cover. He states that
the role of surface ships is primarily defensive. He
points to the inherent weaknesses of surface ships as ASW
plarforms; even when they have tremendous numerical ad-
vantage. Gorshkov believes in mission specific ships
rather than those which perform general missions. But the
Admiral does have hope for surface combatants, particularly
those which possess cruise missiles and nuclear rockets.
He stated in 197^ that surface ships are now technically
equal to submarines in terms of their equipment. This is
the highest praise that the Admiral can award.
Representative quotations: (24:17) j (38:CC3); (75:22-23);




Main theme category: Absence of Soviet foreign bases and
their geographic environment.
Related themes : None
First Appearance: April 3, 1966






% increase/decrease: New theme
Comments: Admiral Gorshkov has long coveted the foreign
bases of the US and British navies. No one recognizes
the Soviet Union's geographic problems better than Admiral
Gorshkov. He has cited the difficulty in transferring
units from the North Sea Fleet to the Pacific Fleet via
the North Sea route. He is very aware of the confines of
the Turkist straits in time of international crisis. But
the Admiral is up against a public policy of Soviet non-
interference with foreign countries (outside the socialist
community) . The Admiral has stated that the avowed purpose
of port visits is to show friendship and increase mutual
understanding. But the Soviet Navy's activity in the
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean cannot expand much
further without shore-related support facilities. The
Admiral can solve the problem in the short term by im-
proving Soviet seakeeping capabilities and underway
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replenishment. But in the long run, the Soviet Navy
must obtain foreign bases.
Representative quotations: (89:20); (90: throughout);




Main theme category: The importance of readiness, mobility,
and vigilance
Related themes: None
First Appearance: July 23, 1955







Comments: This theme appears implicitly or explicitly in
all of Admiral Gorshkov's statements. This is the most
vital and consistent theme of his public writings. The
Admiral is intensely aware that the technological revolution
leaves no room for indecision or delay. If there would be
one theme that he could engrain in his navy, it would be
readiness. The Admiral faces an enemy that is superior in
numbers, in support, and in total firepower. Gorshkov
believes that victory against such an enemy can only be
achieved through initiative, surprise, and qualitative ad-
vantage. All Soviet naval weapons systems are designed to
meet these criteria. Anit-shipping missiles, submarine
launched cruise missiles, and air-launched guided missiles
all conform with Gorshkov's plan to win the "battle for
the first salvo." He is fanatical about requiring that all
training parallel combat operations. Every Soviet sailor
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is trained to respond instantly in the technical environ-
ment. The Admiral trains for a war which will be lost
if vigilance is decreased for an instant. All of Admiral
Gorshkov's speeches hammer these truths home.






Main theme category: Brezhnev
Related themes: The Brezhnev Doctrine
First Appearance: June 196?







Comments: Admiral Gorshkov mentioned Brezhnev in 16% of
his public statements since Brezhnev assumed leadership of
the USSR. Although Gorshkov first noted Brezhnev in June
1967i he did so in conjunction with Kosygin. The Admiral
did not single out Brezhnev as the Soviet leader until
May 1969.





Main theme category: Exploitation of the world's oceans--
the merchant marine, the fishing fleet, and oceanographic
research.
Related themes: None
First Appearance: July 19^7







Comments: Admiral Gorshkov has placed emphasis on this
theme in recent years; particularly since July 1970. The
Admiral believes in integrated sea power. The merchant
marine can often penetrate areas which would be out of
bounds to the Soviet Navy. The fishing fleet is a tremen-
dous source of protein to the USSR. Ocean research has
wide military application. Gorshkov contends that ocean
exploitation will have great significance in coming years.
He wants to ensure that the Soviet Union will lead in this
new competition for world resources.





Main theme category: Soviet interest in the Mediterranean
Related themes: None
First Appearance: February 2, I968







Comments: Admiral Gorshkov often cites the historic right
of the Soviet Union to sail the Mediterranean. He desires
to expell the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean. The
Mediterranean grants access to the strategically sensi-
tive southwest flank of the USSR. The Turkish straits
present a particularly bothersome problem. Gorshkov be-
lieves that the first step in the solution to this problem
is the negotiation of the Mediterranean as a free zone from
nuclear weapons. Gorshkov* s ultimate desire is a Mediter-
ranean free from all military influence. If he is successful
in his goal, the Soviet Union will have won the battle of
the Mediterranean by default.
Representative quotations: (60:E2); (65:E5); (81:3);





Main theme category: Command and Control
Related themes: Communication and staff efficiency
First Appearance: June 6, 1968







Comments : Admiral Gorshkov has spoken of the importance
of communications in modern warfare. He has cited the
widespread use of radio/electronis and automation within
the Soviet Navy. These remarks are most often connected
with reference to nuclear ballistic submarines. This
theme is important but of minor significance in terms of
frequency of appearance.





This appendix contains the Category Reliability and
Intercoder Reliability tests administered for this thesis.
Reliability was measured in the following manner: 1) ten
coders were selected to code the two sample documents
included in this appendix; 2) five of these coders were
selected from the Naval Intelligence Curriculum at the
Naval Postgraduate School, two coders were selected from
other activities at the School, and three coders were se-
lected with no connection with the Graduate School what-
soever; 3) a short briefing on coding requirements was
given to each coder; k) the coders were asked to perform
the following operations--a) determine the main themes in
sample $lj and determine if a set of sivsn themes was
present in sample #2; 5) mean averages were then calculated
to determine intercoder reliability as well as category
reliability. Intercoder Reliability was 92^ and Cate-




Please list the main theme categories that you believe to
"be present in the following excerpts on a separate sheet
of paper. . . .Thank you
Sample #1
Sample—Gorshkov Statement--
The youth of the navy is primarily its ability to keep
up with scientific and technical progress. The navy as a
whole and each of its ships individually reflect the ecnomic
might of the country, the level of its industrial develop-
ment, the successes of its science and technology, and
much else. .
.
Nuclear-powered submarines have now come to the fore-
front as an arm of the service which has most fully incor-
porated the latest achievements of scientific and technical
progress.
The navy had two main tasks: to counter the enemy's
fleet and actions against the shore. The first of these
tasks has had priority for many centuries. But since World
War II the situation has begun to change. Judging by the
development trend of navies and their weapons, the chief
purpose of a navy is now becoming action against land-based
targets . .
.
By making long voyages, engaging in combat training,
and fulfilling responsible tasks of safeguarding the Soviet
Union's state interests and defending its sea borders our
navy is a stabilizing factor making friendly countries
confident of their security. Paying visits of friendship
and good will to foreign ports, the ships of our navy are
successfully fulfilling the noble mission of strengthening
.the friendship of the land of the Soviets with the peoples
of many states and continents.
As a result of our victory, world imperialism was
weakened but did not abandon its objective— the destruction
of communism. Having regrouped their forces the imperial-
ists have now launched preparation for a new world war
under the guidance of the monopolies across the ocean and
of the excessively militant circles who express their in-
terests and with the assistance and support of the reaction-
ary forces of the European countries . The creation of
aggressive military blocs aimed against our country and the
entire socialist community, the speeding of the arms race,
the unleashing of numerous local wars and conflicts, nuclear
blackmail and military provocations— these are the directions
in which they are striving to direct the development of
events in the world arena.
The strategic missile forces are being perfected.
They are outfitted with weapons of tremendous destructive
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power and high accuracy, and today they are the foundation
of the USSR's military pov/er.
...It entered history as a brilliant example of col-
laboration between the Soviet Army and Navy in achieving
victory over the enemy. Joint operations between the Army
and the Navy has developed historically as a traditional
feature of our military and naval art.
Our combat ships have been created and continue to
be created within the conditions of the scientific-technical
revolution, which has spread its impact over all aspects
of military affairs.
Long voyages are schools in seamanship and should lay
the foundation for combat training.
16?







Heir to the combat and revolutionary traditions of
the Russian and the Soviet Navy, the military sailors of
our Motherland are fulfilling their sacred military obli-
gation to the Communist Party and the people with honor
and dignity. Together with all soldiers of the armed forces
they are reliably protecting the peaceful, constructive
work of the Soviet people and are serving vigilantly over
the expanses of the seas and oceans.
Our people are forced to create the material-technical
base of communism in the face of continual opposition from
imperialist trying to slow down socialism's victory proces-
sion across the land by any means. In just the postwar
years alone they have unleased over 30 wars and armed con-
flicts of various scales.
In its Resolution the 2^4-th Congress of the CPSU re-
corded with full justification that American imperialism
is the greatest danger to the independence of peoples and
to universal peace and is the main obstacle in the v/ay of
social progress. Aggressiveness in foreign policy and mili-
taristic expansion, which carries the threat of world war,
are typical of the USA.
Important events leading to a reduction in tension in
various parts of the world have occurred and are now occur-
ring as a result of the tremendous amount of work done by
the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet CPSU Congress.
The most significant event was cessation of the war in
Vietnam and the victory of the heroic Vietnamese people.
Imperialism had retreated. But its aggressive nature re-
mains as before and it continues to be the main source
of wars and military conflicts. It threatens the safety
of our country and the entire socialist fraternity. This
is why our Communist Party at the same time expresses
constant concern over fortifying the defense capabilities
of the country, unwaveringly following the principles of
peaceful coexistence in its relations with different states.
Along with other armed forces branches the Soviet
Navy is also developing harmoniously. The most important
feature inherent to our modern ocean fleet is the youngness
of its ships and all the personnel. Our combat ships have
been created and continue to be created within the condi-
tions of the scientific-technical revolution, which has
spread its impact over all aspects of military affairs.
Therefore together with an extensive and highly diverse
arsenal of modern weapons and technical combat resources,
the submarines, surface vessels, and aircraft concentrate
the latest scientific and technical achievements within





The equipment with which all of our ships are outfitted
has made them quite independent of the distances and time
involved i-n executing the mission imposed upon them. Today
they are wherever necessary on the world's oceans for as
long a time as is required.
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Please indicate if the following themes were present in
Sample #2: Just place a check next to themes present
—
1. The historic traditions of the Soviet Navy
2. The Soviet Union pursues a program of peace backed
by strength
3. The importance of technology and the scientific
revolution
4. The US is hostile to the USSR
5. The importance of the leadership of the CPSU
6. Krushchev is a special patron of the Navy
7. The ultimate triumph of communism
8. The Navy defends Soviet interest at sea
9. The "balanced" fleet concept
10. Cooperation with other branches of the armed forces
11. Exploitation of the world's ocean resources
12. The importance of long cruises and seakeeping
13. The battle for the 1st Salvo
1^-. The submarine is the basic unit of the Navy





All the following documents are speeches, interviews,
articles, papers, statements or comments by Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov. The following abbreviations are employed in
this list: 1) FBIS--Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
2) JPRS--Joint Publications Research Service, 3) FPD--Foreign
Press Division, k) FTD--Foreign Technology Division, and
5) NIC--Naval Intelligence Command.
1. "Gorshkov Addresses Navy Day Meeting," Soviet Home
Service , 1930 GMT, July 23. 1955. FBIS, CC19-20,
July. 27, 1955-
2. "USSR Navy Day," PRAVDA , 0851 GMT, July 2k, 1955.
FBIS, CC5-6, July 25, 1955.
3. "Gorshkov Leads Tribute to Soviet Navy," Soviet Home
Service , 1720 GMT, July 29, 1956, FBIS, CC3- 1+7"
July 31, 1956.
k. "Guarding the Sea Borders," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA , FBIS,
Part 1, February 20, 1958.
5. "Technology and Weapons," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, FBIS,
Part II, February 20, 1958.
6. "Naval Units," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA , FBIS, Part III,
February 20, 1958.
7. "Gorshkov Article," PRAVDA , 0802 GMT, July 27, 1958,
FBIS, CC2, July 28, 1958.
8. "Navy Has Strategic Capability," TASS , 0715 GMT,
February 23, 1959, FBIS, CC22, February 2k, 1959-
9. "Mounting Guard Over the Achievements of Socialism,"
Soviet Fleet
,
February 23, 1959, FBIS, CC7-13, March
10, 1959-
10. "The Navy of the Land of the Soviets," PRAVDA, 0600
GMT, July 26, 1959, FBIS, CC8-11, July 28, 1959-
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11. "A Reliable Guard for the Motherland's Security,"
Soviet Fleet
, February 23, I960, FBIS, CC7-11, March
7, I960.
12. "True Sons of Their Motherland," PRAVDA, 1200 GMT,
July 31, I960, FBIS, CC2-6, August 1, i960.
13. "Admiral Gorshkov Interview," PRAVDA , 0633 GMT,
February 2, 1962, FBIS, BB10-13, February 2, 1962.
14-. "Navy Day Interview," SQVETSKAYA ROSSIYA , July 29,
1962, FPD, 4-162, p. 30, January 4-, 1963.
15. "Vigilant Sons of the Motherland," SQVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
,
July 29, 1962, FPD, 4-162, p. 31-32, January 4, I963
.
16. "On the Maritime Borders," SQVETSKAYA BELORUSSIA
,
July 29, 1962, FPD, 4-162, p. 29, January 4-, 1963.
17. "Responsible Guard," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, October 31,
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.
18. "The Great Tasks of the Soviet Navy," Red Star , Feb-
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19. "4-5th Year of the Soviet Armed Forces," TRUD , February
22, 1963, FPD, 5191, P. 14-, November 21, 1963
.
20. "Guarding the Naval Borders," Navy Day Article, May
30, 1963, FPD, 5191, P. 14-, November 21, I963.
21. "The Navy of Our Motherland," KOMMUNIST V00RUZHENNYKH
SIL, No. 13, July 1963, FPD, 5191, p. 15-17, November
21, 1963.
22. "Gorshkov Speaks at Navy Day Ceremony,
"
Vladivostok
Domestic Service , 1130 GMT, July 28, 1963, FBIS,
CC19-21, July 31, 1963.
23. "Guarding the Peaceful Labor," PRAVDA , July 28, 1963,
also appeared in TASS , 1109 GMT, July 28, 1963, FBIS,
CC2-3, July 29, 19S3T
24-. "The Concern of the Party for the Navy," M0RSK0Y
SBQRNIK , No. 7, July, 1963 , p. 9-18, NIC, May, 1974-.
25« "Gorshkov Reviews Navy's Achievements," Red Star ,
March 21, 1964- , FBIS, CC8-9, March 25, 1964-
.
26. "Admiral Gorshkov Talk," Domestic Servic e, 1550 GMT,
July 25, 1964- , FBIS, CC1-3, July 28, 1964-
.
27. "Guarding the Sea Brothers," PRAVDA , July 26, 1964-
,




28. "Nuclear Fleet: Purposes and Miscalculations," ZA
RUBEZHOM , No. 5, January 29 - February k, 1965, p.
10, JPRS: 28, 781, p. 1-5.
29. "Article by Fleet Admiral," IZVESTIYA , May 5, 19^5,
FBIS, CC9i May 6, 1965.
30. "Battle on the Sea," Literary Gazette, May 6, 1965,
FBIS, CC1-3, May 18, 1965.
31. "Gorshkov on Wartime Role of Danube Flotilla," Moscow
Radio in Serbo-Croatian to Yugoslavia, I83O GMT,
May 20, 1965, FBIS, CC13-14, May 2k, I965.
32. "Naval Might of Soviet Power," Soviet Military Review
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No. 7, July 1965, FPD.
33- "Loyal Sons of the Motherland," PRAVDA , July 2^, 1965,
FBIS, CCl-3i July 28, 1965.
3^. "Soviet Navy Day Talk," Moscow in English to South Asia
,
1100 GMT, April 3, 1966, FBIS, CC2-3. April 4, 1966.
35. "The Watch on the Sea," Soviet Russia , February 1, 1966,
FBIS, CC^-7, February 10, 1966.
36. "Gorshkov Hails Soviet Nuclear Submarines," TASS,
1000 GMT, April 3> 1966, FBIS, CC2-3, April 4, 1966.
37- "Gorshkov* s Red Star Comments on Submarines," Red Star ,
April 3, 1966, FBIS, CC2, April 7.. 1966.
38. "Admiral Gorshkov Speech," Domestic Service , 1730 GMT,
July 30, 1966, FBIS, CC2-3, August 1, 1966.
39- "Meeting in Moscow," TASS , 1528 GMT, July 30, 1966,
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kO. "Always at Battle Stations," TASS, 21^5 GMT, July
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kl. "The Development of Soviet Naval Science," M0RSK0Y
SBORNIK
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No. 2, p. 9-21, I967, NIC.
42. "Gorshkov Reviews Experience of Second World War;
Discusses Capabilities of Armed Forces," KOMSOMOL'
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43. "Gorshkov Speaks in Honor of Navy Day," Agitator ,
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kk. "Gorshkov, Commander of the Armed Forces," Message
Report, June 1967, FPD, July 12, 1967.
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45. "Gorshkov, Navy Day, Leningrad," Message Report,
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46. "Gorshkov," PRAVDA
,
July 30, 1967, Message Report,
FPD, August 30, 1967.
47. "Admiral Gorshkov Interview," TASS , 0402 GMT, July
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FTD-HT-23-455-68.
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51. "Gorshkov Cites Effectiveness of Soviet Navy," TASS
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52. "Gorshkov," Red Star , February 11, 1968, Message Report,
February 16, 1958-
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p. 3, June 6, 1968, FBIS, El, June 12, 1968.
5$. "Gorshkov," IZVESYIYA , July 20, 1968, Message Report,
July 23, 1968.
56. "The Defense of our Maritime Borders," Navy Day Speech,
Message Report, July 22, 1968, NIC, August 8, 1968.
57. "Navy Day Gorshkov Statement," Domestic Service , 1430
GMT, July 27, 1968, FBIS, E4-5, July 29, 1968.
58. "Navy Day Gorshkov Statement," PRAVDA
, p. 2L, July
28, 1968, FBIS, E3-5i July 29, 1968.
59. "Gorshkov Discusses Soviet Naval Strategy," NEUS
DEUTSCHLAND , West German Source, p. 5. August 3, I968,
FBIS, E5-6, August 6, 1968.
60. "Gorshkov Interview on Naval Combat Training," Com-
munist of the Armed Forces, No. 4, p. 27, February
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